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Preface
One of the most striking developments of postwar world
politics has been the growth of bloc politics. Such a develop-
ment has made it possible for many states to exert an in-
fluence far out of proportion to either their population or
political importance when they combine their voting strength
on particular issues in the General Assembly. Notwithstand-
ing the fact that a group's voting power may bear little re-
lation to its military strength, economic resources or pop-
ulation, bloc politics has been a recognized diplomatic
practice to achieve an overall settlement based on mutual
compromises. A general conception of the naturalness and
inevitability of bloc politics in the political climate of the
Assembly has been accepted, though there is lacking a systema-
tic and scientific examination of the total phenomenon. Bloc
politics tend to represent a large part of world politics
today.
In terms of theory of international politics, there have
not been many general theoretical efforts at explaining world
politics. In recent years, partial explanatory theories,
such as power politics, systems theory, normative theory,
equilibrium theory, game theory and the decision-making
approach, have been frequent. All these efforts toward theory
are admirable, but their postures are characterized in
an accumulation of unrelated courses because each one is in
its own fashion. Thus the applications of these theories
iv
in real world politics are not entirely satisfactory.
This study grew out of the desire to explore the recent
trends in international politics and to explain them on the
basis of major ideas of contemporary theories. The idea of
this study originated with Mr. Morton A. Kaplan's six models
of system theory and George Liska's international equilibrium.
The writer admires their pioneer work for a contribution to
contemporary research on international politics; further he
attempts to define a new model of the international system
and suggest an equilibrium theory in a related course of
theoretical research on bloc politics.
I . INTRODUCTION
The post-1945 world marked a totally new system of
bipolarity-- like N.A.T.O. and the Communist bloc--which may
already be passing with the rise of atomic powers like
China and France, and their deviations from the two blocs. At
first, the emergence of independent "nonaligned" states con-
tributed much to the transformation of "bi-polar" confrontations
into an "East-Neutral-West" political configuration. Recently,
Secretary-General U Thant suggested that this tripolar situation
"has been superseded by a complex and fluid pattern of inter-
national relations." The Sino-Soviet split, fissions within
N.A.T.O., and the emergence of the new nations have drastically
altered the conflicts preoccupying national foreign policies.
In another context the Secretary-General predicted that the main
political configuration of the 1970s would contain four centers
2
of power--the United States of America, Europe, Russia and China.
Perhaps it will add to the present two nuclear blocs an indefinite
number of units which will exist on the basis of equality as
possessors of the new weapon. The international trend is the
movement toward what has been called polycentrism, "the loosening
of binding ties in the two great alliance systems and the
See a news item, "Thant Asks Give and Take to Settle East-
West Issues," New York Times (December 3, 1962).
o
"Thant Envisions 4 Power Groups," New York Times (June 29,
1963).
emergence of, if not cogent power, at least partially independent
3
centers of policy."
As the bipolar world loses its definite character, "extreme
bipolarity is gone, perhaps for good. At the same time, a
balance-of-power system, like that over half a century ago, has
4
not been restored and will not be restored in the near future."
We must look for something in between, something less familiar
and for that reason less predictable. The possibility of an
international system composed of a multiplicity of blocs has
been considered by a number of writers in the past few years.
John Herz, having seen this possibility, has argued that a
system of multipolarity would take the form of the "unit veto"
system as defined by Kaplan. Stanley Hoffmann has contended
that there remains a third possibility, a series of supranational
communities, at first regional, and continuously enlarging them-
6
selves— a confederal or federal model. Multi-polarity," Waltz
maintains, will be for the foreseeable future a secondary fact
within the general structure of relations established by the
3
Lawrence S. Finkelstein, "New Trends in International
Affairs," World Politics , Vol. XVIII, No. 1 (October 1965),
p. 118.
4
Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics (New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1965), p. 153.
John H. Herz, International Relations in the Atomic Age (No?
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 34-35.
See Stanley Hoffmann's essay, Organisations Internationales
et Pouvoirs Politiques des Etates, Cahiers de la Fondation Nation-
de Sciences Politiques, No. 52 (Paris: Librairle Armand Colin,
1954), pp. 416-17. (Roger D. Master's translation.)
bipolar world. Roger D. Master's "Multi-bloc" Model may be con-
sidered as a theoretical extension of Kaplan's typology of inter-
8
national systems and as an alternative to his six models. Deutsch
and Singer contend that the multipolar and bipolar models are con-
nected with Richardson's model of arms races and similar kinds
9
of escalating conflicts.
To sum up, the outcome will be either the "multipolar power"
system or "multi-bloc" system. The system will approximate a
rivalry of power among regional blocs, assuming each is armed
with nuclear weapons. Bloc members should rely on the leading
member- -the one possessing the new weapons --to survive. Arms
races and military capabilities make the system unstable. In
the long run, the system would tend to be substantially danger-
10
ous or to be self-destroying.
In fact, the present situation probably falls somewhere
between the bipolar and the multipolar characterizations.
There are a number of conflict dimensions, but the East-West
alignment is much more prominent than the others. As George
Liska says, the contemporary system is "a mixed, bipolar-
multipolar, one with respect to different forms of power;
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World,"
George A. Lanyi and Wilson C. McWilliams, (ed.) Crisis and Con-
tinuity in World Politics (New York: Random Housed 1966), p. 645.
8
Roger D. Master, "A Multi-Bloc Model of the International
System," American Political Science Review , Vol. 55, No. 4
(December 1961), p. 780.
9
Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, "Multipolar Power
Systems and International Stability," World Politics , Vol. 16
No. 3 (April 1964), p. 391.
Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, Ibid .
. p. 406.
and it is tripartite in policy, in function of two dominant
conflicts." Most of those efforts to construct models of
the international system such as Kaplan's six models of in-
ternational system, Masters' multi-bloc model and Deutsch
and Singer's multipolar power systems have been tested by the
application of models to real present world politics, but no
one model can be proved perfect. Perhaps, as Kaplan has said,
"There is a considerable difference between the real world and
the model of an international system. ... A model is designed
to explore selected aspects of reality, and simplifying assump-
12 •
tions are used for this purpose." * It may be, however, that
we have overlooked a number of possibilities from the informal
pattern of world politics. For instance, there is a sub-
stantial body of theory about competitive multi-group politics
in the United Nations which might profitably be applied to
international politics.
The United Nations is an organization of more than 100
sovereign states, but it is questionable whether these states,
each acting separately, can form a universal organization for
the maintenance of peace. The United Nations has begun to
explore the variety of techniques of diplomacy that are at
its disposal to facilitate negotiations between states.
:l
- 1George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 161.
12Morton A. Kaplan, The Revolution in World Politics
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 251.
There has been a world-wide trend toward consolidation and in
some cases integration of formerly isolated states since World
War II. Apart from the United Nations, there are many inter-
national organizations and regional blocs, each reflecting
some degree of interdependence and common action on the basis
of common interests, whether they are social, economic, geo-
graphical, military, or political. It seems essential to
"... speculate on the consequences, for world politics, of the
13
replacement of nations by regional blocs."
The United Nations is a center for reconciling differences.
It is a machine by which measures of peaceful change and
development can take effect. Ernst B. Haas, in describing
the useful function of the United Nations, has concluded that
the Organization might ensure the international breathing
spell necessary to develop "a multi-polar and multi-functional
pattern of policy expectations, and thereby further the habits
of peaceful adjustment of basic tensions." It is also an
instrument by which nations can give effect to their joint
effort in a common cause.
The General Assembly in its day-to-day operation bears
witness to the primacy of politics in the United Nations.
13
See Walter Lippman s speech on "The Atlantic Community,"
at a Conference on "Regionalism and Political Pacts," Phil-
adelphia, May 6, 1949.
Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Un-
iversal International Organization," World Politics
, Vol.
VIII (January 1956), p. 263.
It is an arena of international politics in which states and
groups of states seek influence, prestige, political advan-
tages, or whatever other values may be at stake. More than
this, an extra- legal political structure which has developed
alongside the formal structure established by the Charter
reflects the real power alignments and interests in the
Assembly. Yet it cannot properly be said that the actions
of the General Assembly merely reflect the power realities of
international politics. It is the interaction between
international politics and parliamentary politics that an
understanding of the Assembly must be found.
The United Nations is a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations toward the attainment of their common ends--to
maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly
relations and to achieve international cooperation in solving
international problems of an economic, social, cultural or
humanitarian character. "The presence at United Nations
headquarters of representatives of Member States has facilitated
the development of blocs and groups." The United Nations now
has so many members that some informal grouping of states with
similar interests facilitates the smooth operation of the
Organization.
'--'Robert E. Riggs , Politics in the United Nations: A
Study of U.S. Influence in the General Assembly (Urbana: The
University of Illinois Press, 1958)
,
p. T.
16
Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Na-
tions: A Study of Procedure and Practice (London: Stevens &
Sons Limited, 1960), p. 17.
The present phase in the life of the UN system is ear-
marked by an inter- regional and inter- functional balancing
process. The policies of the system were produced as "a
result of continuous compromises among regional blocs which
differ in internal cohesion with respect to specific UN
c • .I 17functions. It is the principal instance where the groups do
vie for votes, and where the one-state-one-vote principle
holds. This quasi-parliamentary nature of the Organization
gives the small and poor states an arithmetical advantage in
its internal political process. Thus the new independent states
have formed some coherent groupings. They are aware of the
bargaining power conferred upon them by non- commitment in the
cold war. They are active in a mediating, bargaining and
compromising role.
The United Nations does not carry on power politics in
the ordinary sense of the word. It is arrangement politics.
"This reflects something which is of considerable interest
in the world today, namely the decline of power politics
which goes with the decline of the Security Council." 18
On the other hand, the General Assembly is not established as
Ernst B. Haas, "Dynamic Environment and Static System:
Revolutionary Regimes in the UN," Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), The
Revolution in World Politics (New York: Wiley and Sons. 196T5"
pT 294. .'
1 Q
Address of William Clark to Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, January 19, 1960, International Affairs (July,
1960); as quoted from Ernst A. Gross, "Shifting Institutional
Pattern of the United Nations," Francis 0. Wilcox (ed.), The
United States and the United Nations ' (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 75.
a political forum in which the great powers play the game of
power politics. The politics of the General Assembly reflect
an interplay between the forces of pluralism, legal equality,
and diversity among member states. Power perhaps is no longer
19
"the imeediate aim of the nation" or the ultimate aim of
international politics. Trade, aid and alliance, for example,
are essential determinants of conflict policies in internation-
al relations. The politics of arrangement between nations
and blocs of nations tend to be the guiding principle in world
affairs.
The bloc or group is a binding together of states so as
to make it possible for them to act as a unit in foreign
relations, employing coordinated policies, under the direction
of its most influential member. A regional bloc or group may
form as a "Great Power," which reserves sufficient capabilities
to negotiate or bargain with other power blocs. Bloc politics
will be considered as a new political phenomemon emerging
from regional alliances and state coalitions. As early as
1949, Walter Lippman predicted: "The true constituent members
of the international order of the future are communities of
20
states." The existence of groups in the General Assembly
19Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York:
Afred A. Knopf, 1954, 2nd ed.), p. 25.
90
See Walter Lippman's speech on "The Atlantic Aommunity,"
at a Conference on "Regionalism and Political Pacts," Phil-
adelphia, May 6, 1949.
of the United Nations and the importance of their activities
have been recognized ever since its establishment.
Because the various groups of member states play a con-
spicuous role in the decisions of the Assembly, the operation
of these groups deserves study. If our central concern is to
assess the pattern of international politics as it has developed
and been reflected in the United Nations, a scientific and
systematic study of bloc politics is significant and imperative.
There have been few attempts at systematic examination of the
total phenomenon. The present study is to review and evaluate
bloc politics in the General Assembly and will attempt to build
a theoretical system and theory in international politics.
This essay will not attempt to define an abstract model of
the international system (such as Master's Multi-Bloc Model), but
will attempt to define a multi-group model of the international
21
system, playing "multiple equilibrium" among the bloc and groups
of member states in the General Assembly. This suggests that
it might be desirable to construct a multi-group model while
ignoring the effects of nuclear weapons. Our hypothesis is
that the United Nations is an organization not only for avoid-
ing war through the peaceful reconciliation of conflicting
interests but also for remedying injustices. Most of the groups
are active in a mediating, bargaining and compromising role,
The theory of multiple equilibrium may be considered as
a theoretical extension of George Liska's typology of inter-
national equilibrium; for the details of the concepts and
principles of this theory see Chapter VI of this article.
10
and they expand all their influences and social forces so that
a general agreement or consensus among the member states may
be achieved. Multiple equilibrium here means balance. The central
concept, as Liska regards it, is institutional equilibrium—pro-
gressive, stable, and unstable equilibrium. This approach
suggests an understanding of the techniques necessary to effect
political, social, economic and cultural change without re-
course to force. Multiple equilibrium may not significantly
elucidate the whole political process of the General Assembly,
but it is a convenient concept of this study, considering the
balance of the interaction of different groups with one another.
It provides an important focus for the study of group inte-
gration and cooperation.
The choice of the General Assembly as an arena for primary
analysis may be revealed by U Thant's claim that the Assembly
22
is "a realistic representation of the present day world." This
is a projection based on both the practices of interrelations
of the blocs and the contemporary theories of international
politics. It is tentative, assuming the possible development
of world politics into a multi-group (or multi-bloc) inter-
national system which would be distinguished from the classical
nation-state system, bipolar system, multi-polar system and other
international systems. The purpose of 'this article is to ex-
amine bloc politics in the General Assembly and to suggest a
22
See "Thant Asks Give and Take to Settle East-West Issues,"
New York Times (December 3, 1962).
11
multi-group international system and a theory of multiple equilib-
rium, in order to estimate its degrees of adequacy and possi-
bility of future research. If the article helps in anyway to
further such an understanding, it will have served its purpose.
The analysis of this paper is based largely on the doc-
uments of the United Nations, supplemented by theoretical aspects
of international politics. This study--which focuses on five
important and distinct aspects—embraces a general survey of
the blocs and groups that have developed, an identification of
the multiplicity of groups, the conflict dimensions and group
coalitions, some characteristics of multi-group international
system, a theory of multiple equilibrium, and some conclusions.
From the broader, or systematic point of view, we shall
define the pattern of politics that has developed in the General
Assembly with a model of a relatively stable international
system. With such a model, specific changing conditions and
patterns can be assessed "in terms of their impact on the
stability and responsiveness of the world political system.'
In making this comparison a set of hypotheses about how a
nation might behave and work in the United Nations will be
presented. At this stage of the analysis, we shall consider a
delegation as equivalent to the representative of a nation, a
group as a unit, the General Assembly as a major arena, and inter-
national politics at the United Nations as major world politics.
'JHayward R. Alker, Jr. and Bruce M. Russet t, World Politics
in the General Assembly (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965),
P- *•
12
Such assumptions will be disputed by some readers. Neverthe-
less, this is in the spirit of theory as a set of questions,
alerting us to variables and relationships we might otherwise
overlook.
13
II. A GENERAL VIEW OF BLOC POLITICS IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The most significant consequence of the General Assembly's
growing pattern has been the emergence of groups and bloc
politics. The Assembly has tended to become an international
arena in which the political struggles of major groups of our
time are being waged. This trend has promoted a rising interest
in regional and other manageable forms of multilateral coopera-
tion. From this trend, opportunities have developed for flexible
adaptation of policies, programs, and techniques to fit the
evolving conditions. Such a tendency has allowed the Assembly
to take on the complexion of a multi-group system.
To belong to a group, or caucus, and preferably to more
than one group, has almost become a diplomatic feature at the
General Assembly. Some group division in the Assembly is
necessary if the organization is expected to function at all
successfully. "There would be much less stability or continuty
1
to U.N. positions without some formal or informal groupings."
By providing a forum where the groups, geographical or political,
must participate in continuing electoral competition or seek
support for a resolution, the General Assembly performs a major
function in preserving the system's stability.
The groups involving different states are created to satisfy
specific needs for producing common or compatible policies among
the states. They would not be formed unless their members had
John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, How United Nations
Decisions Are Made (New York: Oceans Publications, 1962), p. 64.
14
common attitudes based on common interests or common ideology.
They would not be formed if "the members considered their common
outlook a sufficient guarantee for concerted action on specific
2
measures in the field of their shared attitudes." Blocs
and/or groups operate as units in the General Assembly--
ranging from those with formal organizations and binding commit-
ments to those with no organizations and only similar areas of
interest. Their functions have been variously economic, politi-
cal, military, and cultural.
Special attention to the phenomenon of bloc politics dates
from the ascendancy of the General Assembly over the Security
Council after 1951, and the consequent importance of votes in the
Assembly—which was the adoption of the so-called "Uniting
for Peace Resolution." The uniting for Peace Resolution, which
was designed to enable the General Assembly to act more promptly
and effectively in meeting threatening situations, extended the
competence of the General Assembly and its responsibility for
international security and peace. The preponderance of power
once envisaged for the Security Council has never been marshalled
At the same time, because of the frequent use of the veto (by
the Soviet Union), it was necessary to curb the Council's power
to obstruct cooperative action. Since the Security Council has
lost influence, the prospects of world peace turn not on the
^Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General
Assembly: A Critique and A Proposal," American Political Science
Review
.
Vol. 57 (December 1963), p. 905";
15
Council but on the importance of growing functions of the General
Assembly and the effectiveness of regional group balances of
power. "The General Assembly, like the Security Council, is a
3political body, and politics will inevitably be played therein."
Groups of states will vote together, or differ, dependent upon
their own policies and the national and international interests
involved. As the activities of the General Assembly have
expanded, the various blocs and groups of states have thereby
played a more conspicuous role in the decisions of the Assembly.
Because the General Assembly has been organized to be able to
operate on call within twenty-four hours and because the activi-
ties of groups have been expanded, most of the member-states
have set up permanent missions in Manhattan, New York, rather
than sending delegates to each session of the Assembly. A
permanent mission can provide continual representation with a
greater degree of efficiency and encourage the use of the
Assembly as a propaganda forum as well as an arena for close
political bargaining. Thus the growth of the Assembly into an
increasingly effective organization facilitates the operations
and activities of bloc politics in the United Nations.
With the passing years, the General Assembly has evolved
into an instrument of quiet or private as well as of public
diplomacy. It supplements the traditional processes of
diplomacy. The traditional diplomacy, during the three centuries
3
Margaret E. Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly,"
International Organization
.
Vol. 5 (February 1951), p. 31.
16
ending in 1919, was predicated on the assumption that "everthing
important happened in Europe or was done by Europeans; it was
based on the principle of the inequality of States; ..."
Political changes throughout the world have affected the en-
vironment in which diplomacy operates. "Europe's long-standing
claim to centricity has been challenged."
Surveying the evolution of the diplomatic methods in the
United Nations it appears that the system has been characterized
in many ways. Generally, U.N. diplomacy has been called multi-
lateral diplomacy, public diplomacy, conference diplomacy, or
parliamentary diplomacy. Sometimes it has been termed bloc
diplomacy, diplomacy by groups, and diplomacy by major ties.
When the diplomatic processes in the United Nations have been more
comparable to the classical methods of diplomacy, the methods
there have been referred to as private or quiet diplomacy. The
development of the diplomatic method in the Assembly has seen
an increasing recognition of the possibilities of supplementing
conference diplomacy with quiet diplomacy. This blending of
public and quiet diplomacy gives a uniqueness to the diplomatic
method of the United Nations : the diplomacy of reconciliation
or preventive diplomacy.
4Sydney D. Bailey, op. cit .
,
p. 1.
5 Ibid
.
,
p. 3.
Thomas Hovet, Jr., "The United Nations Diplomacy,"
Journal of International Affairs , Vol. XVII, No. 1 (1963),
17
The General Assembly has constituted a diplomatic parliament--
but not a true legislative parliament—or the "town meeting" of
the world. The chief function of this deliberative assembly is
to crystallize and express world opinion. It is the practice
of public debate, followed by voting, which has given so much
of contemporary multilateral diplomacy its "parliamentary"
character. Many United Nations activities are initiated in the
Assembly and are also to be approved by it. Member states attempt
to increase mutual understanding, to acquire or give information,
to win friends and influence people. The Assembly is frequently
described as a body whose primary justification is that it
provides for an exchange of views between governments . Members
are required to express opinions, at least by voting, on inter-
national problems which, without the organization, would not
have otherwise concerned them. Furthermore, it is the value
which "the General Assembly seems to have as a forum for appealing
to public opinion and building up support among the smaller nations
for Great Power politics, which has been primarily responsible
for the development of its position."
To the smaller nations, the United Nations has enormous value.
The United Nations can help these new and emerging nations find
their places in the world. One of the bases of the United Nations
is the principle of equality of its Members. It is designed to
protect their independence and their sovereignties and to help
Leland M. Goodrich, "Development of the General Assembly,"
International Conciliation , No. 471, p. 278.
18
them advance their people's welfare. It is also a center where
a small state can greatly enhance its influence by joining with
Q
other like-minded states to achieve common objectives." If a
major power can recognize the interests of smaller nations, it
can work out arrangements which will provide adequate voting
support for its views on the matters of its primary concern.
The success of a major power alliance with smaller nations on
major issues is not possible "unless an understanding of the
issues vital to the smaller members is achieved as a basis for
9
compromises that can be worked out to mutual satisfaction."
Reviewing the role of the United Nations in bringing new develop-
ing nations into being and aiding them to achieve economic in-
dependence, U Thant said that "the interests of humanity are
being served by a universal organization practicing the true
principles of democracy on the international plane."
The collective admission of sixteen new nations in December,
1955, symbolized a new period in the United Nations history. The
increasing membership of the United Nations has been an important
factor in the organization and development of blocs and groups.
o
Francis 0. Wilcox, "United States Policy in the United
Nations," Francis 0. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr. (ed.), The
United States and the United Nations (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1961), p. 155.
q
Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960)
,
p. IT".
See "U. N. Voting Shift Opposed by Thant," New York Times
(June 11, 1962).
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The United Nations increased its membership from 51 in 1946 to
117 in 1965. Of one hundred seventeen current members, only
three remain unaffiliated. Most Member states associate with
each other to achieve the common ends which seem to them
desirable. A state which does not belong to any group is forced
"to rely upon more subtle political and economic pressures for
gaining support for its point of view and consequently must
risk individual moves which may have lasting unfavorable effects."
Participation in groups can open avenues for a variety of diplo-
matic techniques. This growth of a diplomatic center at the
United Nations has had an influence on the formation and develop-
ment of political groupings in the General Assembly.
Membership in the United Nations is a symbol of each
country's standing and dignity as a sovereign state. Each member
of the Organization has one vote, and no distinction is made be-
tween large and small, old and new, strong and weak. A member
state does not differ from other members in this respect.
Smaller powers emphasize equality, great powers favor the
hierarchical principle; for example, the General Assembly recog-
nizes the equalitarian principle, and the Security Council the
hierarchical principle. Of all organs of the United Nations,
"the Assembly has received the greatest impact from the increase
in the number of sovereign States . .
.
, since it is the only
^Thomas Hovet, Jr. Bloc Politics in the United Nations .
p. 112.
20
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principal organ to which all Member States belong."
According to the voting rules of the General Assembly, each
member has one vote. Decisions are made by either a simple or
two-third majority, when the formal principle of equality is
applied. Under the one-state, one-vote procedure, the newer
Member states have voting strength out of all proportion to their
populations, contributions, and responsibilities in the United
Nations. One of the main consequences of this system has never-
theless been "to encourage what might be called 'voting power'
politics, the aim of which is to muster the number of votes
(either a two-thirds or simple majority) required to secure the
13
passage of a resolution." Thus in the Assembly the Members
often vote in groups, "either following a strong nation that
represents the position they favor, or uniting behind some
regional or political interest that they have in common.
It is clear that, under certain conditions, some groups--if
combined—may exercise what amounts to a "collective veto"
over the decisions of the General Assembly. Theoretically, for
instance, the Afro-Asian group, if united, could effectively
block any important decision. In practice, however, this has
not tended to occur. If in any case the prescribed majority of
votes can be secured, the minority can then be voted down.
12Sydney Bailey, op. cit
. , p. 253.
13
Geoffrey Goodwin, "The Role of the United Nations in World
Affairs," International Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 1958), p. 28.
14
David C. Coyle, The United Nations and How It Works (New Yoik
and Lond: Columbia University Press, 1960)
,
p. 206.
21
The growth of the bloc and group pattern is to a consid-
erable extent a reflection of the expanding membership of the
United Nations. "As the membership of the United Nations has
increased, the attainment of consensus within the General Assembly
for recommendations or other actions has become increasingly
difficult." Differences in policy and judgment among the
Members of the Organization are bridged to the extent possible
by a continuous flow of diplomatic activity within and around
the Assembly. The adjustment of different views and positions
has drawn Members into group relations in order to have an
effective vote bargaining power. "It provides an opportunity
to create a combined voting power which can be a critical
factor in negotiation with other groups." Group-members
endeavor to align their participants behind predetermined
stands and to cast as many of their votes as possible in a
single direction on important ballotings. Thus the bloc and
group arrangements have become a necessity for effective
negotiation.
The organized groups or blocs which have developed
at the United Nations are informal, but their existence is
recognized. Occasionally a representative may speak
at a United Nations meeting on behalf of a group or
Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, The Dynamics
of Internat iona l Polit ics (New York: The MacMillan Company,
1962), p. 504.
Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the Un ited Nations,
p. 112.
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bloc. The connotations of the following samples from those
records are unmistakable:
Mr. Cooper (Liberia): The Organization, instead of being
united, is now shattered into blocs which seem to be...
"
7
Mr. Pinard (Canada) : Increasingly, also we are dividing
ourselves as Members of the United Nations into smaller
groups. I think that this is in many respects a healthy
phenomenon.
.
.
i°
Mr. Maloes (Philippines) : As chairman of the African-
Asian groups, I want to bring a very important question
to the Assembly.
.
.
iy
Mr. David (.Czechoslovakia) : It is a great honor for me to
speak on behalf of the Eastern countries... u
Mr. Banadaranaike (Ceylon) : I must tell the Assembly that
it is my view, and the views of my colleagues, the other
Asian Prime Ministers,...^ 1
Mr. Spaak (Belgium) : I should first of all like to explain
that I am speaking on behalf not only of my delegation, but
also those of the Netherlands and Luxembourg, the three ??Benelux countries having agreed to speak with one voice...
Mr. Pinard, Canadian delegate, addressing the same session of
the General Assembly two weeks later, said:
i
'United Nations. General Assembly. Eleventh Session.
Official Records. Plenary Meetings (590th meeting, 22 November.
1956), p. 244. Hereafter cited as UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary.
18UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 609th mtg. , 5 December 1956, p. 538.
19
UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 679th mtg., 18 September 1957, p. 15.
iuUN. GA. XII. OR. Plenary, 690th mtg., 26 September 1957,
p. 179.
21
UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 590th mtg., 22 November 1956,
p. 232.
22UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 594th mtg., 24 November 1956,
p. 295.
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"Increasingly, also we are dividing ourselves as Members of
the United Nations into smaller groups.... It can be a
partial solution to the problem of size.... When there is
not time to hear every voice, there is a good deal to be
said for choirs. Most of our groups, moreover, are not
hard blocs. They are flexible and they are fortunately,
not exclusive. It is only natural and fitting that like-
minded countries should work together; but it is neither
natural nor fitting when a group is forced to become--
superficially , at least--so united that it automatically
votes as one, on even the most unimportant procedural
issues
. . .
. 23
Addressing the General Assembly November 22, Mr. Cooper,
delegate from Liberia, said:
"Having formed ourselves into blocs in order to protect or
foster some mode of life peculiar to our environment, or to
enhance our position in world affairs, our stand becomes
inflexible. The Organization, instead of being united, is
now shattered into blocs which seem to be losing all power
of cohesion.... Offices, membership on committees, seats
on various subsidiary organizations are all apportioned
according to the strength of nations and the size of each
bloc. In such conditions, no nation can afford to stand
aloof, basing its interests upon right and justice. To
exist in such conditions, it becomes not only necessary but
imperative for a state to align itself with the group in
which it thinks its interest may be best served and safe-
guarded.
. .
. "**
Each bloc or group, including a leader and loyal group
members or bloc members, tries to convince other members that
it is best able to fulfill their needs and respect their
normative prescriptions. Blocs and pressure groups try to ex-
ercise their influence to win their points or arrive at com-
promises. Political and regional groups "see advantage in
23UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 609th mtg. , 5 December 1956,
pp. 538-539.
24UN. GA. XI. OR. Plenary, 22 November 1956, p. 244.
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establishing an agreed slate which protects their own as well as
2*5
other candidatures." All are apportioned according to the
strength of states and the size of each group. Offices, mem-
berships on committees, seats on various subsidiary organiza-
tions are decided by an unwritten gentleman's agreement in
behind the scenes negotiations. "When there is a high coin-
cidence of interest or common belief among the members of a
regional or other organized group, bloc voting may be anticipated.
And where there is a high coincidence of interest or belief as
between regional or other groups, combinations of blocs may be
anticipated..."" The results are therefore predicatable, to
some extent, to those who have been in touch with the negotiations.
An important initial factor in the development of blocs and
groups is to be found in the necessity of organizing a coalition
of interests of sufficient strength to assure that each bloc
will have as many seats on the councils and as many votes on
the decisions of the United Nations as it can possibly obtain.
The Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the
Trusteeship Council are organs with limited membership. The
seats of the Councils are generally allocated through negotia-
tions, and usually distributed in accordance with the degree
of representation of the interest group or bloc. Frequently
informal or even formal meetings of the delegations concerned
25John Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, op. cit
. . p. 48.
7ft
M. Margaret Ball, op. cit .. p. 31.
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are held for the purpose of establishing an agreed slate of
countries in United Nations elections. Certainly delegates
"prefer discussion of and agreement on a slate before an election
to avoid uncertainty and repeated balloting in which personal
27
and national susceptibilities will possibly be hurt."
It should be pointed out that the General Assembly is a
body which reflects in its decisions on major questions the
results of long and careful negotiations and consideration.
During the process "common lines are elaborated and compromises
reached which give the decisions the character of a confirmation
of a negotiated approach rather than of a resolution achieved
no
through the mechanics of voting." Compromise resolutions,
taking into account the interests of several of the main group-
ings in the Assembly, are most likely to receive a two- thirds
majority vote. The chief business of groups is to create a
consensus within the limitations imposed by intra-group and
inter-group diversities. Group members attempt to attract
support for their proposals from other sides. "Since no group
can be assured of victory on a consistent basis, except on a
few particularly favorable and often ritualistic issues, com-
promise and bargaining must be engaged in continually by all
OQ
sides to obtain the best possible terms.
27 John Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, op. cit
. , p. 49.
See "Excerts From Secretary G. Hammarskjold's Report to the
U.N. Members," New York Times (September 13, 1960), p. 14.
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Robert 0. Keohane, "Political Influence in the General
Assembly, ' International Conciliation
. No. 557 (March 1966), p. 16.
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Some of these negotiations take place outside the United
Nations building at informal or semi-formal meetings in delega-
tion offices. Each delegation usually bargains with other
delegations to the United Nations, and also uses the Assembly
as a political forum to influence world opinion. Many govern-
ments occasionally negotiate directly with other capitals on
major issues. There is however a tendency for the greater part
of these communications to take place in the U.N. building
itself. Most important exchanges of view are carried out in
informal meetings in the small committee rooms at the U.N.
headquarters. Sometimes those groups are formed of individuals
who want to work together towards some agreement. On other
occasions groups are organized by one interested delegation after
or during a formal U.N. meeting. On occasion, formal meetings
are used chiefly as a place where individual delegates can be
30
reached at certain time so as to arrange informal meetings.
Since much of the diplomatic effort in the Assembly is
devoted to building the greatest possible degree of support
for a resolution, the position of each group must be taken into
account. It can progressively fuse into a complex decision-
making apparatus jointly operated by a large group of voting
power. It can establish itself as a bargaining unit; it can
hold a reasonable position in terms of the range of attitudes
acceptable to the majority. The degree of influence that a
group can exercise "will naturally depend on its size, power,
30
John G. Hadwen and Johan Kaufmann, op. cit .
, pp. 49-50.
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and prestige, as well as on the diplomatic skill of its representa-
tives and the tactical situation in the organization." Member
states may attempt to use common group membership or ideological
ties as reasons to support their positions in the Assembly.
The group may also require that its spokesman participate in
negotiations and its views be taken into account.
The United Nations operates far more through personal
relations and informal discussion than formal exchanges and
public debates. Delegates constantly meet one another, not
necessarily careful prearrangement but rather because they so
often have business to discharge in the same building. A con-
tinual process of consultation, arranged and casual, takes place
among friends and leaps across barriers. The blocs and groups
of states organize themselves far more actively in the negotia-
tion processes. Each bloc or group plays a considerably integral
part in the process of dealing with issues. These blocs and
groups operate informally behind the scenes at the United
Nations. This informal structure, "operating within the
formal organization of the United Nations, has had a strong
impact on the type and character of diplomacy in the organiza-
32
tion." Many believe that personal contacts and informal con-
sultations have as much, if not greater, importance than the
formal decisions which are reached. They constribute to the
31
Robert 0. Keohane, op. cit .. p. 33.
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Thomas Hovet, Jr. African in the United Nations (Evanston,
111. : Northwestern University Press, 1963), p. 12.
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promotion of useful decisions both within the organization's
framework and outside it.
The General Assembly is not only a center for this kind of
conciliation, but a major arena of competition. The basic
technique of UN diplomacy is to endeavor "to persuade the
representatives of another government by inducements and appeals
to reason, friendly attachment, magnanimity, self-interest, pride,
33
or even fear. ' As group actors, their roles require them to
try to influence other delegates by some combination of bargain-
ing, coercion, and persuasion. If they can not be persuaded
to adopt a position or action desired, explorations are usually
conducted to ascertain a possible measure of compromise. Thus
these "extra-parliamentary" means of coercing fellow-delegates
have characterized the multi-group model of the international
34
system. The success of groups in achieving their own goals
and satisfying their constituents depends primarily on their
effective application of these means in the international arena.
33Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, op. cit .
,
p. 354.
34For the details of characteristics of the multi-group
model of the international system see Chapter V.
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III. THE IDENTIFICATION OF MULTIPLICITY OF GROUPS
The size of the General Assembly makes some form of regular
cooperation among states necessary; the increasing membership of
the Assembly gives the apparent inevitability of the development
of interest groupings in the political climate of the General
Assembly. Since its diversity insures that such identification
will remain essentially difficult in its complex nature, there
has been no recognized system of identification of the multi-
plicity of groups. This study will examine and identify the
distinct and major groups in the politics of the Assembly.
With a generalized multi-purpose mission, the United Nations
is a global organization for furthering mutual interests. It
is a machine for mutual action, "not an independent supra-
national authority." The Charter of the United Nations re-
cognizes the importance of the regional arrangements and mutual
cooperation. Mutual security, economic problems or other crises
do not necessarily bind all states together under one world
organization. The trend toward regional arrangements and a
multigroup system has been gradual and steady. There were only
three caucusing groups (such as the Latin American, Common-
wealth, and Arab groups) in existence at the San Francisco
Conference of 1945. Now, in addition to the Soviet bloc, six
geographical distribution groups, eight caucusing groups, and
twenty-one regional groups, there are some common interest
Dag Hammarskjold, "The United Nations in the Modern World,"
Journal of International Affairs
. Vol. IX, No. 2 (May 1955), p. 8.
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groups and temporary groups. The formation of blocs and groups
is an historic development unforeseen and desired in 1945,
to which the United Nations is now compelled to adjust
itself."
The blocs and groups of states with their special interests
are exposed to a variety of divisions at the United Nations
meetings. There are--at various times
--divisions not only
between the Soviet bloc and Western countries but also between
developed and underdeveloped countries, between totalitarian
and democratic countries, between donors and receivers of
economic aid, between big powers and small powers, between
colonial powers and anti-colonial countries, among the various
regional areas, among the different color groupings, and a whole
host of other divisions.
In her pioneering study of blocs and groups in the General
Assembly, Margaret M. Ball considers that a bloc is "any group
which consistently votes as a unit on* all or particular kinds
3
of issues." Thus some groups may conceivably be expected
to vote together because they constitute regional groups within
the meaning of the Charter (Organization of American States,
Arab League, North Atlantic Treaty Organization), or because
they simply inhabit the same geographical area (Asia, Latin
Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow" in the New York Herald
Tribune
,
(April 11, 1949); as quoted from Anwar Hussain Syed,
Walter Lippmann' s Philosophy of International Politics (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 189.
3
M. Margaret Ball, op. cit
. . p. 3.
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America, Middle East), or because they have a common ideology
(communist states, democratic states), or because they have
common interests (colonial powers, anti-colonial powers), or
because they have common machinery for consultation in matters
of foreign policy (British Commonwealth, Benelus, Scandinavian
states)
.
John B. Furey argues that a voting bloc is essentially a
sense of solidarity and a definite purpose. He regards the
existence of voting blocs on the basis of common characteristics
(common interests, culture, tradition, ideology, religion,
language or economic outlook; geographical contiguity; or mem-
bership in regional organizations; as well as activity in
election campaigns and the numerous generalizations and
"accusations" that have been made) and common objectives.
In his study of balance of power in the United Nations,
F. H. Soward asserts that there is only one "bloc" in the
Assembly (the Soviet bloc), but he also identifies a number of
"groups": the Afro-Asian, Latin American, Commonwealth, and
European groups
.
Ibid
.
Hohn Bernard Furey, "Voting in the General Assembly,"
(doctoral dissertation, Columbia University), Doctoral Disserta -
tion Series
.
Publication 6620, Ann Arbor, University Microfilms,
195*, pp. 8, 16.
F. H. Soward, "The Changing Balance of Power in the United
Nations," The Political Quarterly
. Vol. 28, No. 4 (October-
December, 1957), pp. 317-318.
32
In his analysis of politics in the United Nations (1958),
Robert E. Riggs makes a distinction between different types of
blocs: those which hold regular caucuses (the Soviet, Arab
League, Afro-Asian, Latin American, and Commonwealth blocs),
those which engage in ad hoc caucusing (the West European bloc,
the "Sixteen", and NATO), and several otheis (Benelux, the Burma-
India- Indonesia group, and Scandinavia plus Iceland).
In a 1960 article, Geoffrey Goodwin has also assessed the
voting behavior or the different caucusing groups on specific
issues, including Hungary, Chinese membership, West Irian, and
the future of the Cameroons. Goodwin asserts that there are
only five "main groups" in the Assembly: the Soviet, Common-
wealth, Western European, and Latin American groups, and the
Afro-Asian group which includes the African group and the Arab
o
League members. He argues that organized groups within the
United Nations add much needed coherence to its political
process and do, by and large, reflect the state of world
politics as it is today.
Roderick C. Ogley in his essay of 1961 identifies eight
different blocs on the basis of "geographical propinquity;
kinship; the assumption of mutual or similar legal rights and
obligations; and a common form of government." He lists the
following blocs: the Communist, American, white Commonwealth,
Robert E. Riggs, op. cit .. pp. 21-27.
o
Geoffrey Goodwin, "The Expanding United Nations, I--
ting Patterns," International Affairs
. Vol. 36 , No. 2(April,Vo
1960), p. 176
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European colonial-, European non-colonial , African, anti-
cs
Communist Asian, and uncommitted Asian states.
In his study of the United Nations (1962), H. G. Nicholas
defines a bloc as a group of states united by geography, history,
race, or ideology, and identifies the following "principal
groupings": the Arabs, the Africans, the Asians, the Latin-
Americans, the Communists, the West European and North
American countries, and the Commonwealth countries.
Writing in 1966, Catherine Senf Manno maintains that the
classification used by the General Assembly in allotting seats
on elective bodies contains the following groups: Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, Asia, Africa, Latin America,
and West and others ("others" are Australia and New Zealand).
Being largely divided on geographic lines, this gives a stable
frame of reference whereas voting blocs are more transient.
Among these various identifications of groupings, some
confusing descriptions can be found. There is some agreement;
almost all authors mention the Afro-Asian, the Arab, the Latin
American, and the Soviet blocs. The main reason for the unsat-
isfactory nature of these analyses of blocs and groups in the
9
Roderick C. Ogley, "Voting and Politics in the General
Assembly," International Relat ions, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April, 1961),
pp. 161-162":
10
H. G. Nicholas, The United Nations As a Political In-
stitution (London: Oxford University, 1962), pp. 117-118.
Catherine Senf Manno, "Selective Weighted Voting in the
UN General Assembly: Rational and Methods," International
Organization
, Vol. XX, No. 1 (Winter, 1966), p. 58.
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United Nations is their failure to distinguish between different
kinds of groupings in the Assembly. This defect is remedied
in Hovet's careful and thorough study. He identifies different
types of blocs and groups, and defines each type in explicit
terms: caucusing bloc, caucusing groups, geographical distribution
groups, regional organization groups, common interest groups,
and temporary groups.
Generally speaking, there are three types of groups among
states at the United Nations based on the nature and role of
blocs and groups. In the first place, there is the ad hoc
coalition which appears to deal with a particular issue, and
which disappears when the issue passes or changes in character.
For example, the sixteen states, which contributed forces to the
action of the United Nations on Korean question, seem to have
maintained regular consultations with respect to matters of
joint concern; the Spanish-speaking countries have occasionally
combined to press the claims of the Spanish language in United
Nations affairs. Other temporary groups may organize and rely
on specific issues in certain situations.
The second type of group consists of states which not only
consult each, other but also always operate as a single unit. The
Soviet bloc with the union of ten members is the most cohesive
and tightly organized group in the General Assembly. This group
alone constitutes a "voting bloc" in the strict sense, since no
12
For the details of descriptions of these groups, see
Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations
, pp. 29-101.
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deviations from the Moscow line are countenanced. Its members
meet frequently and achieve a high degree of coordination in
speaking and voting in the Assembly. From the viewpoint of
give-and-take negotiations with other states, the Soviet bloc has
not the flexibility of the other groups. The Soviet bloc which
turns out to be the most unified is the only bloc of this kind
at the United Nations.
The third type of group, in contrast to the temporary
groups and the Soviet bloc, arises when states are organized to
meet, either regularly or sporadically, to share a common basis
for consultation on issues, though without any commitment to
act in union. Several kinds of groups --caucusing groups,
geographical distribution groups, regional groups and common
interest groups- -are based on certain common organizational features
as follows: A caucusing group is a term applied to any group of
member states in the Assembly which has some degree of formal
organization, "holds fairly regular meetings, and is concerned
with substantive issues and related procedural matter before the
sessions of the General Assembly. "^ The caucusing groups are
the main political groups that operate in the Assembly and are
involved in behind-the-scene negotiations on most of the
crucial issues. They are concerned with attempts to mobilize
strength to influence formal decisions of the various organs
of the United Nations. They also perform a significant role
in preliminary stages of negotiation before the public debates,
13
Ibid.
,
p. 31.
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votes and resolutions. These groups constitute a channel of
14
communications among countries with similar interests. A
caucusing group can benefit from collective interpretations
of factors present in other groups, a procedure which can often
indicate subtleties that are pertinent to working out acceptable
compromises. Participation in a caucusing group itself indicates
"a willingness to seek areas of acceptable compromise, whereas
failure to participate in caucusing groups can suggest an
intransigent attitude which is hardly conducive to successful
diplomacy."
The growth of caucusing groups has been influenced by the
increasing importance of the Assembly and the increasing desire
of states to influence its actions. By 1964 there were eleven
caucusing groups and one caucusing bloc apparent within the
membership of the United Nations. Apart from the Soviet bloc
(the only real bloc), the other eleven caucusing groups are the
Afro-Asian Group, the African Group, the Brazzaville Group,
the Casablanca Group, the Arab Group, the Western European
Group, the European Community Group, the Benelux Group, the
Scandinavian Group, the Latin American Group, and the Common-
wealth Group. Most of the members of the United Nations belong
to at least one of these groups, and some members belong to several.
Thomas Hovet, "The United Nations Diplomacy," p. 37.
Thomas Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations.
p. 112.
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The United States, China (Taiwan), Israel, and South Africa
do not regularly belong to any caucusing group.
For the purpose of allocating seats on the General Committee,
the three Councils, the International Court of Justice, and
other less- than full membership committees, geographical distri-
bution groups are created in accord with informal gentlemen's
agreements in behind-the-scenes negotiations. They are the
result of a working political interpretation developed from the
phraseology of Article 23 of the Charter and any true geographical
distribution in the groups is coincidental. In essence, they
consult only to agree upon which of their members are to be
"nominated" so as to give a geographical distribution to the
composition of the smaller organs in the United Nations in
accord with the number of seats allocated to the particular
16
group.
In addition to five geographical distribution groups, which
show no overlap of membership, there is another group which
has widely overlapping membership but which is also acknowledged
in the distribution of elective seats: Commonwealth group. These
five distinct geographical groups are: Eastern European group,
Asian and African group, Latin American group, Western European
and other states group, and Permanent members of the Security
Council group. Most of these groups are identical with the
caucusing groups: the Asian and African geographical distribu-
tion group is identical with the Asian-African caucusing group;
16
Ibid.
,
p. 33.
38
the Latin American geographical distribution group is identical
with the Latin American caucusing group; the Commonwealth
geographical distribution group is identical with the Common-
wealth caucusing group.
Regional groups which are created- on the basis of regional
arrangements, treaties, or alliances, are groups of the United
Nations members bound together either by common membership in
a regional organization not connected directly with the United
Nations or by common participation in important regional con-
ferences. They are distinguished by the fact that for the most
part they do not have any regularly procedural or organiza-
tional features operating in the General Assembly, nor do they
have a geographical basis for allocating seats in the United
Nations organs. Nevertheless, they display a high degree of
cohesion in the Assembly, since their members are usually
bound by mutual agreement on treaties or negotiations. It
should be pointed out that the reflection of regional group
consensus in the Assembly is generally limited to the particular
issues upon which they have developed common points of views.
There are a number of regional groups in the Assembly, using
their original names. Several of the regional groups are
For example, Anzus Council, Arab League, Baghdad Pact,
Balkan Alliance, Bandung Conference, Colombo Plan, Commonwealth,
Conference of Independent African States, Council of Europe,
European Atomic Energy Community, European Coal and Steel Communi-
ty, European Common Market, European Economic Cooperation,
Europeans Payments Union, Nordic Council, North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, Organization of European Economic Cooperation,
Organization of American States, Organization of Central American
States, South East Asia Treaty Organization, Warsaw Pact, Western
European Union.
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identical in membership with previously considered groups and
blocs. In all of these regional groups, the highest degree of
cohesion is on votes connected with collective measures and
peaceful settlement issues.
Common interest groups, as their name indicates, have
some interests in common which tend to provide a common outlook
on certain types of issues before the General Assembly. They
are not bound together by any sort of formal arrangement or
membership in a regional body; nevertheless, they have obvious
common ties which provide a sense of cohesion in particular
issues. At least seven groups of common interest may be dis-
tinguished: Moslem States, Arab States, Anti-colonial States,
Big Three (France, United Kingdom, and the United States),
Colonial Powers, Trust Administrators, Underdeveloped Countries.
"Whether these common interest groups actually exist may be a
moot question; some observers indicate that they do exist and
18
have an influence."
It should be emphasized that the identification of these
groups depends upon their decision in the vote, not upon explicit
bargaining among diverse coalitions which may change promises
of support before the vote. It might be supposed that, for
example, one set of states might offer its support to another
set cold war issues, and in reciprocity demand the other's
support on a self-determination issue. Voting groups in the
General Assembly provide a relevant datum for an effort to
18
Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations
, p.. 44
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identify these groups.
Both the total membership of the United Nations and the
group relationship of the members have been changed in the
General Assembly. Although a number of groups in the Assembly
retain their distinctiveness in the actual balloting, recent
discoveries indicate a more complicated pattern or relation-
ship, since the expansion of Assembly membership has in fact
gone beyond the differentiation of new voting groups. With
the exception of the Soviet bloc, the groups do not exist as
rigid formations. In various matters they contest or cooperate
and their members vote freely, in spite of frequent pressures
from within and without the bloc, according to their interests
and convictions. The groups are flexible and rigid formations
hardly exist. They normally shift according to the question at
issue.
On the other hand, within and across groups lines there are
more or less well-organized subgroups arranged along political,
historical, ethnic, or special interest lines. For instance,
the Afro-Asian group consists of a number of subgroups,
sometimes with overlapping membership, which are often at odds
on policy matters-- the Arab League, the Brazzaville group,
the French Community, the Casablanca group, the Asian and
African members of the Commonwealth, the three Asian members of
19S.E.A.T.O., and the three Asian members of C.E.N.T.O. In
19Norman D. Palmer, "The Afro-Asians in the United Nations,"
Franz B. Gross (ed.) The United States and the United Nations
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 140.
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practice, one can find that on many issues the group is widely
divided. Even though the Commonwealth group meets occasionally,
the group is politically divided and no longer has a significant
joint role in nominating candidates for Assembly offices.
It is argued that the Commonwealth group can "in no sense be
regarded a voting Power, of economic 'have' and economic 'have-
20
not,' many members will frequently be voting on opposite sides."
Thus group separateness and relationships are radically different
from the present structure of dividing and overlapping ties
or networks of alliances.
The so-called Afro-Asian group is not much of a bloc since
it contains conservatives, moderates and radicals, since this
spectrum shifts as governments change, since alliances and
traditional associations with Western states continue sporadically
to operate, since often uninstructed delegates do a great deal of
freewheeling, and. since common goals are not always shared by
Africans and Asians or by subregional groups with these con-
21
tinental conglomeration. But in some conditions, it is a
functioning and organized group, and its members have achieved
a higher degree of unity on issues, such as colonial issues,
that have come before the United Nations.
The Afro-Asian group seems to be most closely united on
matters relating to economic development and self-determination
20Geoffrey Goodwin, op. cit
, p. 176.
21Charles W. Yost, "The United Nations: Crisis of Confidence
and Will," Foreign Affairs , Vol. 45, No. 1 (October 1966), p. 30.
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of peoples. The group has access to about sixty African and
Asian countries—virtually half of the world's populations.
The very size of the caucus group enables it to deny an over-
whelming majority to any one. This gives the group great
bargaining power. In that sense the group can paralyze the
United Nations and can also elevate the Organization to new
levels of achievement as a result of dependence upon, and
22
attachment to, its principles and purposes. Nevertheless,
a far from united voting record is presented in an examination
of the over all votes of African-Asian states. Recently the
group made a very conscious effort to stress harmony by not
holding meetings on issues involving disputes between group
members and thus preventing the spread of disharmony to those
issues upon which the group might find common ground.
The Arab caucusing group has been operating as an interest
group ever since the San Francisco Conference and is one of the
most cohesive groups in the entire course of the U.N. history.
"The members of the Arab League meet almost daily while the
Assembly is in session to discuss questions of tactics and
coordination of policy. "^ The group has been fairly effective
in presenting a "united front" to the Assembly- -much more so
than most caucusing groups. It is true that the members of the
group have a common religion, common historical unity, common
"Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia: A Political
Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 190.
23Robert E. Riggs , op. cit ., p. 22.
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cultural heritage, and common language. The voting record
suggests that there is a high degree of cohesion in the Arab
group and some lessening of cohesion in a few cases.
The African caucusing group was organized in May 1958
following the first session of the Conference of Independent
African States. As African membership in the United Nations
has increased, the group has grown correspondingly. Since 1962
the group has been divided into the Basablanca group, the
Brazzaville group, and a number of other less organized but
still distinguishable factions. The fact that French is the
official language of members of the Brazzaville group has
tended to set them apart from the other African states. Because
of its nonalignment policy the Casablanca group constitutes
itself as a lobby within both the African and the Afro-Asian
caucusing groups. Other factions of the African group may be
as a result of the various conferences or agreements that have
brought together particular groups of African states. All
these sub-groups are very informal in the Assembly. As a whole,
the African caucusing group is the most cohesive in the matters
of self-determination, economic development and cold war.
The three Benelux countries, Belegium, Netherlands, and
Luxembour, seem to have worked as a united group throughout the
history of the General Assembly. The frequent consultations
among the three states justify their existence as a caucusing
group. The group has operated as a unit within the slightly
^Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations
, pp. 75-106.
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larger Western European caucusing group. As a whole, it has
displayed a high degree of cohesion in the General Assembly.
The Western European group members share elements of common
historical development, similar political organization, and
regional organizational ties. An examination of the voting
record indicates that the group is the most cohesive in the
development of international law, self-determination and
collective measures.
The Commonwealth group is bound not only by simple loose
political ties but also by economic ties of integrated trade
and the sterling area. The group has had a wealth of con-
sultative experience which has been carried over into the
United Nations. It remains a diverse group, interested in
a common strategy where it is possible to agree, but in no
sense a hard and fast organization. The voting record of the
group provides considerable evidence as to the looseness of its
organization. It presents a picture of fairly individualist
action on any issues on which particular members may have
strong convictions. It seems to comprise several factions none
25
of which in itself is closely unified.
Unlike most of the other groups in the Assembly, the Latin
American caucusing group has had nearly the same membership
during the entire history of the organization. From the very
first Assembly its representatives have met to decide upon
^Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations
,
pp. 69-73.
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La tin -American candidates for Assembly elections and to discuss
other matters of common interest. The group has the highest
degree of indertical votes on matters concerned with economic,
humanitarian, and social cooperation. The voting record
appears to indicate that the majority of the group tends to
vote together most of the time, but the group has less cohesion.
The group has some of the characteristics of a loosely organ-
ized party.
The Scandianvian group has a broad basis for common action
and outlook in their geographical proximity, cultural ties,
a similarity of languages, the existence of similar democratic
political systems. The group is not divided at all on collective
measures, and has a very cohesive voting record on peaceful
settlement, self-determination, and economic, social, and
humanitarian cooperation issues.
We find a very high degree of unity within most of the
caucusing groups. Other groupings and evidences of leadership
are not uniform, except almost always in the Soviet bloc;
they normally shift according to the question at issue. All of
groups are flexible and many have overlapping memberships.
In many instances, one encounters not only confusion as to
bloc and group identities but also only partial awareness of
the full extent of the bloc and group structure in the General
Assembly.
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IV. CONFLICT DIMENSIONS AND GROUP COALITIONS
IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
After identifying the blocs and groups in the General
Assembly, the next steps are the classification of issues and
conflict dimensions and the measurement of coalitions of these
groups. We shall concentrate on the examination and assessment
of developing issues and alignments. The United Nations, as a
center for harmonizing the actions of nations, promotes debates
and the international exchange of ideas. The approach here
will be to study the developments of issues and group coali-
tions as reflected in Assembly debates and decisions.
The General Assembly is an organization of some 120
sovereign states, but the arena of international politics in
which it exists is militarily dominated by a small number of
powerful groups. Since it exists in a world of tension, the
General Assembly is very sensitive to the impact of external
events and decisions. All member states are represented
and are repeatedly required to take formal positions on almost
every issue of importance. In the political climate of the
General Assembly, various members, blocs and pressure groups
are forced to or try to exercise their influence to get what
they want or to arrive at some acceptable compromise for a
solution. Perhaps no state or group can be well satisfied with
the influence which it exercises in the United Nations. No
group consistently succeeds in achieving all wants; it is
impossible in any democratic organization. No one should
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always "win." In terms of game theory, the world may be thought
of as a political system in which the major groups are analogous
to several parties which compete for the favor of the floating
voters. Politics in the General Assembly consists of a set of
potentially paramount contests, such as the cold war or self-
determination, each with different antagonists, different
diplomatic techniques and policies for winning the game, and
positive goal values usually to be divided among the players.
If the idea of competition is ever to become widely accepted
in international politics, it must be through the realization
that all players share at least some interests.
During the postwar period national objectives and alliance
configurations within the Assembly were remarkably continuous.
The most obvious continuity has been the emergence of the
superimposition of the political process upon that of diplomacy.
Supranationalist issues have increasingly moved to the heart
of U.N. politics. An important implication is that "U.N.
supranationalism efforts that tend to be most often successful
in and outside of the United Nations are those issues appearing
to most members" as East vs. West and North vs. South. The
trend toward more East-West and North-South conflicts is clear.
The General Assembly has been faced most frequently with
two types of questions: those concerning relationships between
LHayward R. Alker and Bruce Russett, World Politics in
the General Assembly (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 19bi;
,
p. 81.
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the two great power blocs and those primarily affecting the
relations between economically developed states and economically
less-developed states. Since 1947 East-West conflict has been
a most frequent voting alignment in the Assembly. It consists
of such cold war issues as U.N. membership, the Balkan crisis,
and policy toward non-self-governing territories . In 1952
"U.N. supranationalism was more a North-South than an East-
West issue. 1 The Assembly has become a principal political
forum for "the nations which remain outside the East-West camps
and pursue their own goals of political independence, economic
3
improvement, and racial equality." North-South conflict, for
various reasons, has been developed as the second most prevalent
voting pattern.
The cold war political pattern is essentially bipolar,
possibly "loose bipolar". In our discussion of bloc politics
we have sometimes spoken largely in terms of two-bloc competition.
Two-bloc competition is logically confined to a world where most
conflicts form on a single dimension. But where a bipolar
system will in fact emerge depends heavily on the distribution
of preferences. Two blocs may converge toward similar positions,
or a third may arise in the center. As we see, an East-West
political pattern is by far the most common one in the General
Assembly. Nevertheless, a third nonaligned group has appeared.
2
Ibid., p. 78.
3 Ibid.
,
p. 127.
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The nonaligned states have developed as a third force to counter
great-power pressure. The so-called loose bipolar political
pattern is revealed by the fact that the basic East-West conflict
remains essentially bipolar, with some states in the middle.
But the East-West dimension is not a single conflict. "It
is composed of a number of issues on which state's positions do
vary somewhat along the East-West line; issues like the Cold
War, colonial self-determination, and Palestine questions."
Change is inherent in the claim that "the East-West
confrontation is no longer the primary one within the United
Nations, or perhaps, even in international relations outside
the General Assembly." A second set of issues is suggested by
the degree to which the tripolar "East-Neutral-West" political
pattern has gradually replaced the bipolar confrontation. North-
South is the second most important dimension; it essentially
pits the developed countries against the underdeveloped ones.
After describing the evolution of an "East-Neutral-West" situa-
tion U Thank emphasized issues more of a North-South or sup-
ranational sort. "The time has come for us to direct our
attention more to the economic and social structure of society
and particularly to the disparity in the wealth of nations which
is one of the root causes of political tension."
4
Bruce Russett, op. cit
. , p. 154.
Hayward R. Alker and Bruce Russett, op. cit
. . p. 3.
"Thant Asks Give and Take to Settle East-West Issues "
New York Times (December 3, 1962).
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Almost one- third of the Assembly's current membership
joined in 1960 and thereafter; most of these states are
relatively moderate, with no strong ties to either of the great
powers. There are "at present no less than 72 Afro-Asians,
almost two-thirds of the membership, and another 25, including
all the Latin Americans, which line up with the 'have not'
in 'North-South' controversies." The second and largest
category of disputes dealt with by the Assembly has had to do
with tensions between major Western powers and the developing
countries. Many of these conflicts have arisen out of the
Q
liquidation of colonial relationships. On occasion, for
instance, most of the states of Western Europe join with the
Soviet bloc to vote against the undeveloped countries--a kind
of North-South dimension.
Since 1962 the centers of gravity of world power have
shifted--perhaps from bipolar to multi-polar confrontations.
Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson, chief U.S. delegate at the United
Nations, considered that the growth of the General Assembly in
its membership caused "the absolute majority" to pass from
9
the West to the African and Asian states.- The newly indepen-
dent African-Asian group can prevent the Assembly from passing
Charles W. Yost, op. cit . , p. 29.
Q
H. Field Haviland, Jr., "The United States and the United
Nations," International Organization , Vol. XIX, No. 3 (Summer,
1965), p. ZW.
"Stevenson Asserts U.N. Balance Shifts," New York Times
(April 9, 1962).
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issues with an overwhelming majority. This group is therefore
already in a strong position to urge other groups to consider
the desirability of making concessions. Obviously the neutral
group may much prefer a world where neither an East nor a West
polar group wins the final victory. Rather than a tightening
bipolar struggle between an Eastern and a Western party, however,
such findings suggest that the decline of bipolar confronat-
tion has been associated with the beginnings of a multipolar
configuration, in which each of the poles is especially in-
terested in and certainly influential on particular substantive
issues before the Assembly.
Secretary-General U Thant has urged the great powers to
use the General Assembly as a realistic representation of the
present-day world, a world containing many other issues distinct
from the cold war. The significance of his analysis is the
assumption of growing diffusion of power in international
relations. In contrast to the Security Council's veto privilege
for great powers, the Assembly's political formula of one
state-one vote is clearly decentralized. As issues distinct
from the cold war arise, the power of cold war bloc leaders is
also likely to decline. In this respect, to urge greater use
of the Assembly is, therefore, to favor the continuation of
this diffusion of power.
"Thant Asks Give and Take to Settle East West Issues,"
New York Times (December 2, 1962).
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Slightly more encouraging is the decentralization of
power, at least within the Assembly. There has been a gradual
decline of the cold war dimension and an increase in the need
for compromise on a remarkably stable set of vast Assembly
conflicts. To say that strictly cold war divisions are
far less common in the United Nations does not necessarily
indicate that they are so in the world at large. The wider
sharing of power on cold war issues indicates that more Assembly
groups are willing to compromise their positions or bargain
for additional votes in order to achieve support for their
resolutions. Some of the resulting alignments have appeared
on supranationalist or colonial intervention dimensions. This
is reflected in the increased prominence of suprnationalist
issues which are, frequently, attempts to limit the cold war
in certain areas of special interest to "nonaligned. " Certainly
the nonaligned states are trying to keep the cold war out of
the Assembly.
When policy preferences cannot be placed nicely along a
single dimension, choice must be considered from a multi-
dimensional framework and small groups must often prevail
in determining collective preferences. There remains a number
of distinct dimensions, distinct enough to permit and even
encourage compromising and bargaining. The emergence of
new issues might eventually contribute to an increase in the
dimensions of conflicts. Recently it has been estimated that
although nearly a hundred issues may be on the agenda of a
session of the Assembly, some four to five hundred issues are
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negotiated between the states behind the scenes. Many have
argued that "any proliferation in the number of issues brought
before the United Nations should, in the long run, contribute
11
to stabilizing the system.
As mentioned previously, a significant development in
United Nations diplomacy has been the crystallization of
caucusing and voting ,blocs at the Assembly, where the African-
Asian group, the Arab League, the Soviet bloc, the Latin
American group, and some other groupings of states regularly
meet to seek united stands on questions before the organization.
All groups, with the exception of the Soviet bloc, are much
looser and their members often divide on votes and policies.
Today no group can succeed in dominating the Assembly consistently
on the whole spectrum of issues before it. But the attitudes
of those African, Asian, and Latin American states that take
independent and moderate courses in Assembly politics are
crucial. This has meant that African and Asian states moderately
and self-consciously have generally held the "balance of power."
These act as an intra-Assembly interest group working for fav-
orable trade and development policies. Other groups are not so
large, but their importance in the political process of the
Assembly is considerable.
Before a discussion of group coalitions in the Assembly,
understanding the major influences on voting behavior would be
Hayward R. Alker and Bruce Russett, op. cit .
, p. 164.
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very helpful. Many variables appear relevant to Assembly pol-
itics: the regional, social, economic, and political forces
mainly affecting national foreign policies. Georgraphical
location can be so defined as to correspond generally with the
various caucusing, geographical distribution, or regional groups
in the Assembly. Per capita G.N. P. can be used as a measure of
wealth and economic development. Treaty and compact can be
employed as common ties for collective action. According to
diplomatic and scholarly opinions on world politics, all social
and political variables included in the factors of race, col-
onial status, political system, and military alliances may
polarize East-West, North-South or other voting patterns in
the Assembly.
These variables are explained as correlation with voting
dimensions and alignments in the Assembly, Alliance, aid,
political system, and trade all show high correlations with the
East-West dimension. On the North-South dimension, colonial
status, race and trade contribute to the Assembly's polariza-
tion. Aid and alliance polarize cold war alignments more than
they do self-determination voting. Colonial status and per
capita G.N. P. do not appreciably correlate with cold war align-
ments, but do polarize self-determination alignments. Any
change in the substantive content of these two major dimensions
"can be associated with East-West or North-South components,
with changing environmental polarizations, or with the changing
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membership of the United Nations." These variables also help
explain the voting and the per cent of the voting variation.
One of the easiest ways of determining the possible effect
of a grouping arrangement in the Assembly is to examine the
voting records of member states. Votes in the Assembly have
provided unique data where many national governments commit
themselves simultaneously and publicly on a wide variety of
major issues. Though the grouping does behind-the-scenes ne-
gotiations among the members, formal votes must be taken in the
meetings, in which each member has one vote. Votes are not
binding but imply a moral obligation. The voting records of
the group members display the degree of cohesion and show the
attitude toward an issue concerned.
A voting bloc has been defined as given number of nations
voting as a unit a given percentage of the time on a given
issue or all issues. It may also be considered as five or more
nations voting as a unit at least eighty per cent of the time
on all the issues selected. Groupings of caucusing or regional nat-
ure will be termed groups, since they reflect a lower degree
on the cohesion of the voting. The group or groups might take
the form of an active attitude toward a neutral policy, or might
include a number of states which are flexible to constitute a
body of floating voters, chiefly interested in more parochial
concerns and ready to bargain with each of the major poles to
further their own ends
.
12
Ibid.
,
p. 280.
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Roll-call votes provide an especially useful means of
identifying a state's attitudes. Occurring on a very wide
variety of issues, they force a state to take a position. All
votes (yes, no, abstain) are recorded and analyzed in a high-
speed electronic computer. A member state may abstain or be
absent, and thus avoid stating a clear pro or con position. The
use of voting in the Assembly symbolizes the principle of
equality of states. Superficially all member states have
equal right and obligation in the maintenance of international
peace, but they do not have equal interests in every particular
question that arises. Groupings of common interest become a
normal phenomenon.
Since the first loyalties of states are to their own
national interests, a remarkable fact about the way states associ-
ate in the Assembly is the tendency of member states to affiliate
differently for different purposes. If many different kinds of
issues are considered in the Assembly, the voting will show
the different kinds of alignments. Each state may bargain for
issues that it considers vital to its national interest. "The
necessity for building majorities encourages the caucusing of
groups with similar interests in achieving their national
13
objectives."
Member states associate with each other to achieve the common
ends which seem to them desirable. Each delegation or group
13Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations
, p. 15.
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must maintain certain cooperative contacts with every other del-
egation or group, because it may expect to vote with them on
at least one controversial issue or set of issues. In this com-
plex process of association, each may sacrifice something for
a concession, not through any disregard of principle, but
because members know that their national interests can be pro-
moted only by taking account of the national interests of others.
If the recognition of an international interest can not be accept-
ed, bargaining, competition or pressure will be the result.
"Bargaining-
-the exchange of support on one issue for back-
ing on another--is facilitated.' Vote trading--"you vote for
15
me in this matter, and I will vote for you in that"-- is probab-
ly most frequent on issues that affect some states very deeply
but many others less; few states would like to trade their votes
on an issue of general importance. The process of mutual
accommodation is of a continuing nature. The quid pro quo system
may operate between one state and another, or between two groups.
For example, a group might offer its support to another group on
cold war issues, in response to the other's votes on a self-
determination roll-call. This kind of bargaining would occur,
though an analysis of voting patterns alone would not find it.
In a competitive world there are many potentialities to be
exploited by the voters. Competition between the great powers
14
Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics
, p. 85.
U.N. GA. II. OR. Plenary. 167th mtg. , November 3, 1947,
p. 695.
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is likely to necessitate concessions to lesser powers and the
offer of substantial favors in the form of foreign aid or the
achievement of other goals. While the great powers, such as the
United States and the Soviet Union, see the United Nations
primarily as a forum for promoting Cold War interests, the inde-
pendents and the nonaligned find themselves in relatively weak
bargaining positions, As the membership of the organization
increases, there grows an even greater inclination to organize
the voting strength of the new independent states. They can use
their votes on East-West conflicts to bargain for concessions
on other dimensions. Not only does competition provide these
states with eager suitors for their favor, it furnishes them
numerous opportunities to seek actively the fullfillment of
their wishes. Even with the greater prominence of supranation-
alism and self-determination issues, many nations have substantial
freedom of maneuver. Most of the voters including all the
neutrals and even many others, prefer a world of continuing
competition and no final resolution of the East-West division.
"By making a public commitment to nonalignment , a state improves
its bargaining position with those using pressure to influence
its actions."
In the General Assembly we often see the polarization of
attitudes on the decline. The cross-pressured voters, by their
relative independence, are more likely to shift allegiances or
to make group competition for their favor meaningful. The
Robert 0. Keohane, op. cit
. . pp. 20-21.
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virtue of a group of "balancers" is that "they form a floating
vote, aligning now with one side, then with another, and often
being sufficiently uncohesive that some members of the group can
be picked off by either side." The influx of the cross-pressure
voters into the Assembly arena has meant not only that most
voters now prefer a "middle" solution to East-West problems
but that most voters are relatively apathetic toward any par-
ticular issue. Their preferences are reserved for "what are to
them private matters- -the independence, unification, and dev-
elopment of their own countries, by whatever methods." Modera-
tion and flexibility are inevitable, because a too uniform
cohesion and rigid noncommitment to either side would deprive
the group of its value. They have considerable influences on
the coalition of Assembly groups.
The most common alignment has been called "East-West"
because of the content of the issues of which it is composed.
The Soviet Bloc and the allies of the United States are at
opposite ends of this continuum, as one might imagine. "The
more overriding East-West issues become, the more flexibility
is lost.... As the East-West alignment becomes frequently
19
relative to other dimensions, bargaining becomes more difficult.
The cooperation of new African-Asian states has formed a second
Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, op. cit
.
p. 271.
18
Bruce M. Russett, Trends in World Politics
, p. 61.
19
Ibid
., p. 85.
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common alignment as a "North-South" dimension. Since 1963,
there has been a moment of group fence-mending among the major
participants in both the East-West cold war and the North-South
"have" versus "have not" struggle. They are using the current
tension in intergroup collisions to revise strategy and try to
patch up divided alliances. Specifically, cross-group coali-
tions of African, Asian and Latin American states are evident.
"A number of states in each of these groups agree more often
with certain states in the two other groups than with members
20
of their own group." In another context, it has been alleged
that "America, Western Europe, and the Soviet Bloc may someday
decide that they share a common interest in preserving their
21
wealth from confiscation by an aroused underdeveloped bloc."
This could conceivably produce the emergence of a new "have"
group, followed by the merger of the former opponents into a
single group. These two comments suggest that many of the
Assembly's voting patterns have regularly been based on intra-
group and inter-group coalitions rather than strict adherence
to group boundaries
.
This whole pattern of shifting vote alignments can con-
tribute a fluidity and flexibility to the system of multi-
groups. The requirement of flexibility of alignment implies
that a state can participate in more than a single group.
20
Robert 0. Keohane, op. cit
. , p. 11.
21
Bruce M. Russett, op. cit . , p. 66.
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Alignments on specific issues may cross group lines. What is
now happening is a shift within the groups themselves, a fluid-
ity of voting alignment reflecting the dynamic shifts within
regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Afro-Asian
group, for instance, has become four discernible sub-groups:
the five Casablanca powers, the French community nations, the
22
pro-Western, and the middle of the road group. Divisions among
Latin American groups are often present, although the lines of
cleavage are not as consistent as they are for the other regions.
Moreover, cross-group coalitions are very much in evidence on
a number of issues such as disarmament, peacekeeping, colonial-
ism, social and economic questions, and other political issues.
The composition of cross-group coalitions varies, but par-
ticipating states are usually more moderate—closer to the
political center of the Assembly- -than most other members of
their groups.
The present analysis suggests that groups in the General
Assembly do not necessarily act as unified and disciplined
blocs. For several reasons the stability of the international
system will be increased if there are many different issues
and alignments. The spread of voting patterns on multi-dimen-
sions and group coalitions symbolizes the decentralization of
polarizations in the Assembly.
22Lincoln P. Bloomfield, The New Diplomacy in the United
Nations," Francis 0. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr., (ed.),
The United States and the United Nations (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1961), pp. 56-57.
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V. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MULTI-GROUP SYSTEM
A number of attempts have been made in recent years to
build models of the international system, among which Morton
Kaplan's six alternative models and Roger Master's multi-bloc
model are the most clear-cut and consistent, based on bipolar
or multi-polar images of the international system. Most of
these efforts have been directed to the application of models
more or less derived from military capabilities and natural
sciences. The systems approach of Kaplan and Master is
essentially based on relationships which are determined by the
number and powers of the members of the system.
Kaplan's approach represents a courageous attempt to
construct theoretical systems in international politics. Among
the models described by Kaplan, the bipolar system (both "loose"
and "tight" models) which corresponds to contemporary regional
organizations has two major bloc "actors", with uncommitted
nation-states on the margin and an "international actor" such
as the United Nations playing a limited role in the former
model. Since bipolarity, as mentioned previously, may already
be passing with the rise of atomic powers like China and
France and its integration into a new multi-polar system may
be in the offing, Roger Master attempts to define an abstract
Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), ch. 2;
see also his "Balance of Power, Bipolarity, and Other Models
of International Systems," American Political Science Keviev,
Vol. 51 (September, 1947), pp. 6a<*-95.
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model of the international system, "as a supplement to the
2types presented by Morton A. Kaplan." Thus Master's multi-
bloc model of the international system is a theoretical extension
of Kaplan's typology of systems theory and an alternative to
his six models. Referring to Kaplan's "balance of power" system,
Master applies all Kaplan's rules in his own system of multi-
bloc model. Formulation of a multi-bloc or polycentric pattern
of the international system is an attempt in this direction.
Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer state that the most prominent
models of the tight bipolar and multi-polar world can be inter-
preted in terms of the dynamic model of conflict by Lewis F.
3
Richardson. The results of arms races suggest that multi-
polar systems operating under the rules of balance-of-power
policies are shown to be self-destroying, since the problem
of nuclear-destruction has not been solved.
Wilfram F. Hanrieder argues that many important relationships
of the contemporary international system combine both bipolar
and multi-bloc characteristics. Consequently, "the terminology
of Kaplan's loose bipolar system is too bipolar, while Master's
model goes to the other extreme by neglecting bipolar attributes
altogether."
2
Roger D. Master, op. cit
, p. 780.
3
Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, op. cit .
, p. 406.
Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International System: Bipolar
or Multibloc?" The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol. IX, No. 3
(September 1966;
,
p. 301.
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In terms of military capability, George Liska refers to the
contemporary system as a mix, bipolar-multi-polar, one with
respect to forms of power. In the last resort--represented by
strategic nuclear weapons--it is still bipolar. He concludes
that the strategic nuclear level is bipolar; the quasi-multi-
polarity on the political-diplomatic plane is diffuse. Recently
R.N. Rosecrance affirmed: "In the end we will discover that
neither bipolarity nor multipolarity provides general solutions
,,6
to basic conflicts in the contemporary international system.
It is true that there is a considerable difference between
the real world and the model of an international system. For
reasons of theoretical convenience, a model is concerned with
conditions which are consistent with stability; nevertheless,
it is used to move away from reality. This essay will not
define an abstract model of the international system but is
based on the realities of international politics. The concepts
and ideas of a multi-group model are derived from politics and
diplomacy, not from military capabilities or natural science.
This means that it might be desirable to construct a multi-
group model while ignoring the effects of nuclear weapons,
since the international system, as George Liska believes, is
infinitely "multi-polar in political-diplomatic influence."
George Liska, Nations in Alliance, p. 162.
R. N. Rosecrance "Bipolarity, Multi-polarity, and the
Future," The Journal of Conflict Resolution , VI. X, No. 3
(September 1966), p. 317.
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A great number of states, and groups within states, behave as
if they were independent poles" in the politics of the state
system.
A principal mutual interest in the current international
arena, though not the only one, is the avoidance of general
war. New forms of international interdependence require that
"the concept of power ... must be adapted to cover a control
situation which is not a pure case of dominance submission from
8
one state to another." National policies and values are con-
sidered within the framework of new institutional norms. Power
in this context is measured by voting groups rather than be
military alliances, and "the criterion of a nation's power is
the ability to induce support in quasi-parliamentary dealings
rather than the increase or decrease of territorial possessions.
The decentralization of power within the United Nations
has been noted. From one such view the reinstatement of a
decentralized international balance of* power system, supported'
by a nuclear stalemate, may be the key to world stability in
the future. We shall define stability as the probability that
the system depends on some degree of consensus on basis values
George Liska, Nations in Alliance
, p. 162.
8
Kenneth W. Thompson, "Theory-making in international pol-
itics: a review of George Liska, International Equilibrium: a
theoretical essay on the politics and organization of security,"
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. II, No. 2 (1958).
p. 190.
9
George Liska, International Equilibrium
, p. 21.
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as well as interests and that large-scale war does not occur.
That is, as the international system moves away from bipolar to
multi-group, the frequency and intensity of wars should be ex-
pected to diminish.
To do so, it has been necessary to make three assumptions:
First, that nuclear forces are irrelevant; second, that all
concepts and ideas examined previously apply; and third, that
each group has a certain degree of cohesion, acting as unit.
The following sections will remove these assumptions one at a
time. This chapter will concentrate on the comparison of inter-
national systems and concentrate on the characteristics of a
multi-group system.
The first is the "balance of power" system, which corres-
ponds roughly to that which prevailed in the Western World in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is characterized
by a small number of national states, of roughly equal size
and strength. In this system, the actors are exclusively
national actors to enable the system to work. The nation is
the focus of solidarity sentiments for the members of the
nation; "the nation-state itself must depend largely upon its
own ability to survive." In contrast to the "balance of power"
system, the actors within the multi-group system are group
actors or bloc actors to facilitate the operation of the system.
Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, The Pol-
itical Foundations of International Law (New York : John Wiley
6c Sons, Inc.
, 1961)
,
p. 31.
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A specific interest or common interest will be the focus of
solidarity elements for the members of the group. The group
members must rely largely on mutual compromise and mutual agree-
ment, otherwise the member will be isolated from the group, and
even from the system. While the "balance of power" system is
characterized by short-term alignments based on relatively
immediate security objectives, the multi-group system is stab-
ilized by the operation of common interests--long term and/or
short term interests- -which lead to the formation of groups.
The increase in the number of independent states will elim-
inate another area of mutual arrangement and ultimately perhaps
reintroduce a new pattern of international system in world
politics, displacing the nation-state scheme. Thus the tradi-
tional nation-state system--the "balance of power" system--
which has been the dominant pattern of international politics
for some four centuries is evolving toward a system in which
regional grouping of states will be more important than inde-
pendent sovereign units. Since World War II the trend toward
regionalism has been so pronounced that it is now an acknowledged
feature of the international scene, as nationalism tended his-
torically to support the traditional system of nation-state
politics. The multi-group system has probably stemmed from the
idea that nothing in the United Nations Charter precludes the
existence of regional arrangements, provided that they are
"consistent with the purposes and principles of the Organization."
See Article 52, the United Nations Charter.
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The multi-group has developed and marked a new international
system of bloc politics in the United Nations. The classical
nation-state is still in existence, although its influence is
declining. The new system, at the present stage, has not in
any real sense breached the barrier of sovereign state system;
it has provided the impetus and the agency for much closer co-
operation of the states on the various regional levels.
In the introductory chapter we identified the post-World
War II system of international politics as essentially bipolar,
with two super-powers leading alliances in direct conflict, and
a number of weaker states attempting to maintain a nonaligned
status. The "loose bipolar" system, according to Kaplan,
corresponds roughly to what we have today. The system differs
in many important respects from the "balance of power" system.
Supra-national actors--bloc actors like N.A.T.O. and the Communist
bloc or a universal actor like the United Nations—participate
within the international system. Nearly all national actors
12belong to one or the other of the bipolar blocs. The "tight
bipolar" system will evolve if and when the nonaligned group
disappears and the system is virtually reduced to two power
blocs. Contrary to the "tight bipolar" system, the contemporary
international system tends to move the bipolar to the multi-
polar system, with the rise of atomic powers like China and
12
Morton A. Kaplan, "Loose Bipolarity: A Model of an Inter-
national System," in George A. Lanyi and Wilson C. McWilllams'
(ed.) Crisis and Continuity in World Politics: Readings in
International Relations (New York: Random House. 1966). p. 645.
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France as new "Supranational actors." Although the current
discussions of the international system generally assume the
existence of a bipolar situation, there are in fact a multi-
plicity of regional alliances of varying degrees of integration.
The multi-group system differs from the bipolar inter-
national system in many respects that have consequences for
the operation of international politics. In the first place,
there are many groups or voting blocs to facilitate the opera-
tion of the multi-group system, while "the loose bipolar system
has two blocs of direct consequence for the operation of the
,13
system." In the second place, in the multi-group system all
groups have international characteristics on the basis of equal
status; the two leading blocs have supranational characteristics
in a bipolar system. In the third place, the multi-group system
is stabilized by the almost automatic operation of common in-
terests—either long-term or short- term- -which lead to formations
of blocs and groups; in the bi-polar system alignment must be
based on long term interests; "conflicts of short-term interest
tend to be ignored." In the fourth place, an essential feature
of stability within the multi-group system is that the multi-
lateral method necessitates compromise and limits the freedom of
action of the greatest among states; the "possession of a larger
13Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, op. cit . , p.
51.
14
Ibid
., p. 50.
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stockpile of atomic and thermonuclear weapons" by both major
blocs is a factor for stability within the bipolar system.
In a situation of bipolar conflict, the superpower with the
greater interest gains its advantage from its greater willing-
ness to commit itself in gaining its objective. The relations
between two powers would be competitive in that each would seek
to prevent the other from attaining predominance either mil-
itarily or in connection with the emergence of multi-polar
world. For these reasons, "any successful efforts by the
United States and other powers to slow down the dissemination
of nuclear weapons would tend to increase the stability of the
1 ft
entire international system." Kenneth N. Waltz believes that
inflexibility of a bipolar world may promote a greater stability
17
than flexible balances of power among a larger number of states.
In regard to the bipolar states, there might be individual
interests supporting military guarantees or economic assistance '.'
from one of the major powers.
Nevertheless, things have changed. A "multi-polar" or
"multi-bloc" model of the international system has been suggest-
ed, because of the appearance of contradictions within each
Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other
Models of International Systems," American Political Science
Review , Vol. 51 (September 1957), p. 692.
Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, op. cit
. , p. 404.
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World,"
George A. Lanyi and Wilson C. McWilliams (ed.), Crisis and
Continuity in World Politics : Readings in International Relations
(New York: Random House, 1966), p. 728.
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great power bloc of bipolarity. This is exemplified in the
Western camp by General De Gaulle's independence from both the
United States and Great Britain in many fields, especially in
the creation of French atomic power and the withdrawal of
N.A.T.O. troops from France. In the Eastern bloc, contradic-
tions were evident in Communist China's demand that the Soviet
Union share its atomic weaponry with China. Peking's refusal
to recognize the principle of "peaceful co-existence," and
recent successes of atomic tests will extend unlimited support
to China's deviation from the Soviet bloc. Hence there may
eventually be four Super-Powers in place of the present two,
but that day does not appear to be imminent.
"Multipolarity" or "polycentrism," might be terms better
fitting a situation, or system, in which each unit constitutes
a center or pole of absolute power. It is applied to an inter-
national system in which each "actor," regardless of size,
possesses an invulnerable nuclear capability such that it may
destroy any other actor. In a world of roughly equal blocs,
each actor would presumably have approached a level of "ab-
solute" power. There would be rivalries stemming from the
variety of national perspectives and positions; there would
also be common interests in resisting the ambitions of the two
big powers of the United States and the Soviet Union. While
"multi-polarity" is defined in the case of a nuclear power
system, the multi-group model is defined in the case of a
United Nations voting system. In the politics of the United
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Nations, neither bipolarity nor multipolarity provides general
solutions to basic conflicts in the contemporary international
system. For example, many of the Afro-Asian countries which
serve as "mediators" in the bipolar tension relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union trade their own security
issues, in which the superpowers are interested, for support
1 8
on colonial and economic aid issues. Obviously this relation-
ship is neither bipolar nor multi-power. Power is measured
on the basis of the voting group rather than on nuclear weapons
as in the multi-group system.
Kaplan's "universal international" system assumes that the
"universal actor" (e.g., the United Nations) is sufficiently
powerful to prevent war among the national actors. The nation-
al actors still retain individuality and jockey for power and
position within the framework of the "universal actor." In
the multi-group system, the United Nations is a center of con-
ciliation among member states with little supranational authority.
The United Nations primarily serves mediating functions- -i.e.
providing a locus for diplomatic contacts and implementing
agreed solutions. In other words, the Organization would likely
continue its current functions, rather than develop punitive
sanctions, as in the case of a collective security system.
General characteristics of the multi-group system may be
those of informal association, mutual compromise, flexibility of
organization, the pursuit of peace, and other diplomatic techniques.
18
Wolfram F. Hanrieder, op. cit . , p. 303.
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As the foregoing analysis suggests, the forms of organized
association which have developed in the United Nations are
informal and unofficial, although their existence is recognized.
Most U.N. decisions are settled by informal negotiating processes
outside the formal meetings. The growth of an informal group
system has been influenced by a number of factors : "the nature
of the voting in the General Assembly, the process of election
to organs on which not all the members are represented, the
growth of U.N. membership, and the increasingly important role
19
of the center of diplomacy."
However, bloc politics in the General Assembly are inevit-
able. The organization of groups has given to the Assembly
some of the characteristics of a parliament of the multi-
party type. If the trend towards a more formal organization of
groups continues, "it may be that there will be more contact
between the chairmen of these groups on matters concerning the
organization of the business of the Assembly." In other
words, the nature of the Assembly not only makes voting associa-
tions necessary, but it makes them easier to achieve in other
organs. It is a normal part of diplomacy for states to consult
each other on matters of common interest, and perhaps one of
the chief reasons why this happens rather easily at the United
Nations.
19Thomas Hovet, Jr., Africa in the United Nations
, p. 13.
20
Sydney D. Bailey, op. cit
. , p. 20.
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Mutual compromise in the affairs of bloc politics charac-
terizes the new multi-group model, and accords with the re-
quirements of the multi-group system. To member states in the
United Nations, it has become a normal diplomatic attempt to
increase mutual understanding, to win friends and influence
people, to acquire or give information, and to achieve an
overall settlement based on mutual compromise. States are almost
forced to accept some reasonable compromise on issues concerning
them if their valid public objections are met. Compromises
involve not only concessions by one group to another, but also
feature bargaining on the basis of concessions by one group.
The Assembly is a political body searching for solutions
based on compromises. Each issue or debate requires a different
diplomatic technique and a different solution. Delegates and
groups of delegates meet frequently outside the council chambers
and committee rooms, often by prearrangeroent and in some cases
with a fair degree of regularity, to discuss the important
issues at hand. "Negotiations are initiated, compromises made,
21
and decisions taken." Since no group can be assured of vic-
tory on a consistent basis, "compromise and bargaining must be
engaged in continually by all sides to obtain the best possible
„22
terms.
21Robert Riggs, op. cit
. , p. 1.
22Robert 0. Keohane, op. cit
., p. 16.
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Flexibility of association-- the present structure of over-
lapping membership among groups--is an essential characteristic
of the multi-group system. With the exception of the Soviet
bloc, groups rarely exist as rigid formations. These groups are
flexible and fluid. They cooperate in various instances.
Each delegation or group must maintain certain cooperative
contacts with every other delegation or group, since "it may
expect to vote with them on at least one controversial issue
or set of issues. This whole pattern of shifting vote align-
no
ments can contribute a fluidity and flexibility to the system."
In this flexible process lies the hope for progress and coopera-
tion among the members, where for the first time in history
"all human races and civilizations- -great and small, advanced
24
and backward—can meet on a footing of legal equality." The
multi-group system develops a considerable flexibility and
the group actors themselves constitute relatively loose
organizations.
It is suggested here that a multi-group system would
necessarily be peaceful, in accordance with the principle of
pacific settlement of any international dispute. The Charter
recognizes the importance of regional arrangements and their
use in appropriate cases and the states' first choice to settle
disputes by peaceful means. The United Nations is only one of
2iHayward R. Alker, Jr., and Bruce M. Russett, op. cit
.
,
pp. 215-216
24Char
ings in International Politics: Concepts and Issues (New York
-
:
Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 244.
les 0. Lerche, Jr. and Margaret E. Lerche (ed.), Read-
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the tools which states have created to maintain international
peace and security. It is reasonable to believe that group
actors would be necessarily capable of preferring negotiation
to war. There is no need to assume that the behavior of a
group-actor would be more "agressive' 1 than that of a national
actor. War in such a system would not arise from sources fund-
amentally different from those in a nation-state system. A
multi-group model therefore is compatible with the rule of
seeking solution by negotiation rather than by fighting.
The goal of negotiation may be the winning over of the
other states to participate in some groups or organizations or
in a mutual-security arrangement; it may be the securing of
support for some proposal in the United Nations, whatever it
may be, negotiation entails the presentation of views and
counterviews
,
the compromising of differences, the search for
areas of mutual interest and common agreement and the conclusion
25
of some form of agreement or accord. ' Diplomatic negotiation
may create the atmosphere of settlement of international dis-
putes by peaceful means.
In view of the intricacies of the political process at the
Assembly, a number of extra-parliamentary means have been
employed to achieve the objectives of national interests or
common group interests. The exercise of political influence
in the Assembly is many-sided and even subtle. As political
25Padelford J. Lincoln and George A. Lincoln, op. cit.
,
p. 353.
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actors, their role requires them to try to influence other
voters by some combination of bargaining, compromise, persua-
sion, coercion and even threat. Certainly the system is such
as to provide some actors with greater extraparliamentary means
of affecting their fellows than is true in the national system.
In a multi-group model where bargaining, compromise, and re-
sponsiveness to the primary demands of other groups is repeated-
ly practiced, the chances for political stability and peace-
ful change have significantly increased.
In the future our projected Utopias should set up expecta-
tions of security, stability and peace. This may be called
"universalism" or "idealism". As a symbol of the interde-
pendence of groups, the United Nations would primarily serve
mediating functions--i.e. providing a locus for diplomatic
contacts and implementing agreeable solutions under an "impar-
tial aegis." A group, an intermediate unit, perhaps, is more
likely to be the operative factor in the transition from
nationalism to universalism or idealism, for regionalism has
characterized the multi-group system. In many cases the na-
tions of the world are making an effort to achieve the goal
of universialism or idealism. Trends in this direction may
lead to an approximation of what George Liska has defined as
an "international equilibrium", in which regional and universal
organizations complement one another. The objective of our
research is to serve the ideal of our projected Utopias. There-
fore we shall tentatively define a theory of multiple equilibrium
in the multi- group system.
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VI. THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIUM
It seems for a moment that the era of the balance of
power has been superseded by the era of multiple equilibrium.
The need for a link between the old and the new balancing
principle is disclosed the moment one inquires into the condi-
tions of an effective system of multiple equilibrium. A multi-
group system of international politics following Liska's
theory of "international equilibrium" has been proposed,
with the addition of the United Nations as a presumably un-
avoidable part of the' structure. To do so, it has been nec-
essary to make three basic assumptions: first, each group is
a relatively integrated whole, acting as a unit; secondly,
the General Assembly is concerned with an international arena
of political struggle; thirdly, Liska's ideas of equilibrium
on a regional scale apply.
Equilibrium is a pervasive concept derived from economics.
The notion of an equilibrium has played an important part in
contemporary theory partly because an equilibrium is felt to
be desirable. While equilibrium is usually defined explicitly
or implicitly by theorists of international relations such
as Liska and Kaplan, it has received more political than
economic explications. Liska's central concept drawn from
economics is institutional equilibrium. He has suggested that
international organization may be treated as part of "a dynamic
interplay of institutional military-political, and socio-economic
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factors and pressures," constituting to a greater or lesser
degree, a multiple equilibrium. "He thereby pioneers and opens
new pathways for others who may turn attention to equilibrium
n
theory. To its credit, the model Liska develops is original."
Equilibrium is also central in Kaplan. He postulates the rules
which actors follow, and the equilibrium conditions for six
different models which will occur when disequilibrium occurs.
The conditions of equilibrium may be regarded as the results of
the operation of certain rules, limits, norms and goals. Liska'
s
theory, however, is a more general equilibrium system tran-
scending Kaplan's six situations.
The traditional pattern of balance of power is one-
dimensional; it is concerned only with physical power and the
relations of states in terms of territory and security. The
contemporary balancing process is unique in its multiple aspects,
in the complex system of interdependence created between distinct
regional and functional aspirations, having little to do with
security and territory so far as some of the chief protagonists
3
are concerned. The balance of power is traditionally to
preserve the nation-state system. It is a general rule that
the smaller states should follow the interest of the balance
George Liska, International Equilibrium (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press , 1957)
,
p. 15.
2
Kenneth W. Thompson, op. cit
. . p. 189.
o
Ernst Hass, "Retionalism, Functional ism and Universal
International Organization," p. 262.
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and their own by allying themselves with the major power or
powers. States may have opportunities for "balance plus" in
power contests with others. In fact, of course, smaller states
are most vulnerable when there is an imbalance among the Great
Powers, for the balance of power may oscillate at the expense of
the weak. According to multiple equilibrium, the network of
equilibrium established in the United Nations especially gives
the smaller states a substantial sense of security. Multi-
lateralism tends to supersede bilateralism and enables smaller
states to avoid an unequal confrontation with the Great Powers,
since the United Nations guarantees their equal footing as
sovereign states. The multilateral method of diplomacy—which
implies less coercive methods and promises security through
reciprocity-- limits the freedom of action of the great states.
Forcible subjection of a member would be resisted by collec-
tive sanctions. It also disperses rather than polarizes relation--
either bipolar or multipolar. In a multi-group situation, a
voting bloc rather than a military alliance is the typical means
of increasing one's weight of multiple equilibrium in the Gen-
eral Assembly. A group cannot but strengthen the position of
its members in the international arena of balancing and bar-
tering influence in multilateral diplomacy.
Reference to the so-called "decline of power politics" is
of particular interest. While the power-politics school stresses
political military forces as major elements in the guidance of the
traditional balance of power, Liska proposes a new pattern of
international equilibrium based on normative and socio-economic
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factors rather than the usual military and political power
elements. Liska defines his idea of equilibrium as a norm, and
actual dynamics with sufficient rigor. The concept of power in
international politics, according to Liska, must be adapted to
cover a control situation which is not a pure case of dominance
and submission from one state to another. The relationship
basic to this extend is the interdependence among nations in
dealing with supranational phenomena which affect national
politics, but over which no single state can exert an effective
control independently of other states. Interdependence among
nations is the very factor which brings nations together for the
solution of problems which cannot be solved in isolation or by
conquest. The power involved is not necessarily only a clear-
cut dominance-submission nexus of control between individual states.
"The entire concept of balance of power, as a stabilizing
force in international politics, has been criticized for its
unreality, its imprecision, and its inherent danger." Histori-
cally, the balance of power has been among the facts of inter-
national life and its processes exist in interstate relations.
As in some previous historical periods, it is argued that the con-
temporary situation is seen by some as relatively simple balance,
or a bipolar distribution of power. But "a bipolar balance is
usually regarded as being inherently even more brittle, unstable,
^William C. Olson, The Theory and Practice of International
Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966),
p. 83.
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and dangerous than a more complex system."
Since a mutual security commitment--colective security-
influences the state of the military-political equilibrium, tradi-
tionally known as the balance of power, the United Nations becomes
then a coactive rather than merely a passive framework of inter-
national relations and a real factor in the multiple equilibrium.
It is enough to say that the General Assembly is ultimately a
process of multilateral balancing of influence on the part of
delegations of member-states who seek "to adjust conflicts so
as to promote national values and policies within the frame-
work of institutional norm and the actualities of a primitive
international community." To some extent, the General Assembly
is also a system of legal norms and general principles, agreed
upon as standards of conduct and there is an existential inter-
play toward some kind of equilibrium among unequally powerful
members with different policies, and among the various groups
themselves. The present Assembly has been characterized by a
harmonious relationship among coalitions or groups, each one
taking great pains to avoid a showdown.
The norm of equilibrium is a joint recognition of new states,
general reciprocal guarantees and collective measures against a
threat to the peace, implemented by all members of the United
Nations under definite rules and procedures. The norms are
chiefly those of the law and of the shared purposes shaping
5
Ibid.
,
p. 81.
6
George Liska, International Equilibrium'
, v. 20.
83
the interplay of policies in the Organization. The universally
applicable norms of contemporary international politics are
different in many respects from those of the nineteenth century.
Many aspects of intergroup relations, for example, are not effec-
tively regulated by "balance" of military capabilities, but, are,
rather, regulated by norms sustained by international interest
or community interest. Ernst Haas suggests that "balancing
implies the preservation of security through a process of negotia-
tion, conciliation and mediation."
Having emphasized the moral force in the Assembly, David
Cushman Coyle says :
"... the U.N. General Assembly .,. is an organ set up to
discuss world affairs and express as nearly as possible the
moral judgments of the world. Voting is a part of this
expression but not the chief part. The moral force in the
Assembly, by which it can hurt a nation that is doing
wrong and help one that is doing right, depends in the last
analysis not only on the final vote but even more on what
was said, who said it, and what people of the world think
of the argument put„forward and of the parts played by
nations concerned."
Accordingly, each group in the multi-group system stresses
a normative principle against power and excessive political
discretion and likes to visualize itself as a qualitative and
moral factor in world affairs. As far as Prime Minister Nehru
is concerned, the nonalignment (of the Afro-Asian group) implies
what has been called a "Third Force." This is a contradiction
Ernst Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalist!), and Universal
International Organization," p. 240.
^David Cushman Coyle, op. cit . , p. 206.
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in terms, because members do not create a force. They may create
moral pressures, but not force. Most of the groups favor the
expansion of the Assembly's function and jurisdiction and wish
to shape the multiple equilibrium so as to maximize their in-
fluence and maintain "the balance of power" with other groups
in the United Nations. Without a doubt they oppose extensive
authority for the Great Powers, and they expect the Organization
to be active or passive, an impartial mediator or partisan,
according to their changing needs. Conceivably, those groups
are determined to play the role of maintaining the peace and sec-
urity of the world and present their views to be heard in the
settlement of any international issue.
The idea of equilibrium is a convenient unifying concept--
a convenient tool of analysis. In the first place, states seek
to maintain the best equilibrium instead of the best power
position. Secondly, all groups seek to settle for themselves
by all kinds of negotiations the best attainable position in the
multiple equilibrium system. Thirdly, the majority of groups
must act so as to promote the equilibrium of the multi-group
system as the necessary condition for the system's survival and
evolution by no other than peaceful means into higher forms
of community. Fourthly, groups viewed as collective actors feel
that the existing distribution of "security, welfare and prestige"
is the best possible one relative to their power positions; the
multi-group system is in equilibrium. Fifthly, "the dual character
of the equilibrium concept as a theoretical construct and a
desirable policy for safeguarding humane values brings together
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the analytical and the normative perspectives." Finally,
"equilibrium may be considered in terms of the over-all social
and material environment of states individually and in combina-
tion." 10
The theory of multiple equilibrium here submitted assumes
that a mutual compromise or decision of the groups in the General
Assembly requires that institutional, military-political, and
socio-economic factors and pressures for and against stability
be deliberately equilibrated, or be faced with the occurrence of
a possibly oppressive disequilibrium. The importance of multiple
equilibrium is that it is reflected in the attempt to combine
political-military equilibrium through collective security and
a cooperative approach to long-range socio-economic porblems
in a concentrated attack on the problem of war and peace through
international organization.
Since much of the diplomatic effort in the Assembly is devot-
ed to building the greatest possible degree of support for a
resolution, a consensus or mutual compromise among major groups
has been taken into account. The chief business of the group
is to create a consensus within the limitations imposed by
independent sovereignties and intra-group diversity. Thus draft-
ing committees may be appointed to formulate compromise reso-
lutions and negotiating committees may be appointed to deal with
Q
George Liska, International Equilibrium , p. 16.
Kenneth W. Thompson, op. cit ., p. 190.
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other groups. A "winning 1, resolution in the Assembly requires
not only the accepted compromise of one's own regular allies
and supporters, but also the support of other groups combined
as a sufficient majority of votes.
A truly negotiated settlement entails concessions and compro-
mise. Members of the United Nations must avoid a tendency to
support compromise for the sake of compromise. "If a unanimous-
ly accepted compromise cannot be reached, no official group
action is taken. None of the groups make decisions by majority
11
vote that are binding on all members." Each group holds a
reasonable position in terms of the arrangement of attitudes
acceptable to the majority, and its own position is dependent
upon its established bargaining unit, not upon those of other
Assembly members. The lack of control over the Assembly by
any group of states, as well as the absence of large and cohesive
groups, means that a powerful force for compromise is added to
whatever self-restraint may be practiced by members for various
reasons
.
Although multi-group phenomenon is not especially new, a
complex was recently discovered. Majority- voting has induced
the members of the United Nations to coalesce in groups in order
to make their arms prevail. A member of a group can partici-
pate in meetings and attempt to exercise leadership within its
region. On the other hand, ambitious delegates can take advantage
Robert 0. Keohane, op. cit
. , p. 16.
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of group membership to exercise their bargaining power with
other groups in the exchange of support on certain issues or
other values. The main task of a group is to create a consensus
among group-members and to expand its political influence in
the General Assembly to achieve its ends by altering the behavior
of other member-states without the exertion of physical force.
All these efforts are based on gentlemen's agreements on the
basis of negotiation behind the scenes. There is, of course,
no assurance that agreements reached will be acceptable to the
group as a whole. In this way, it may sometimes be possible to
mold the consensus of a region a certain way. However, it is
often frustrating and its results are frequently vapid. It is
less desirable to belong to a large and powerful group, if a
state's policy is not politically compatible with that of a
majority of members. A delegation that is unable to take
effective leadership within its own group is unlikely to be
influential in the Assembly.
It has been argued that because of the majority-rule
principle the smaller and poorer states have an incentive to
band together in the United Nations that they do not have else-
where. Almost one- third of the Assembly's current membership
joined in 1960 or thereafter; most of these states are non-
aligned with no strong ties to either of the great powers. Taking
advantage of great-power divisions, these states have developed
policies of non-alignment and corollary techniques at the United
Nations to void the impact of power politics from great powers.
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As an intra-Assembly interest group, these states influence the
decisions and tendencies of the United Nations, and the latter,
in turn, influences the destinies of these states which find
in the world organization "not only a shield or protection from
the dangers of global war, or local and limited ones, but con-
fidence and dignity unequaled in modern history by the mere
12
fact of equality of membership and voting." The selection of
Secretary-General U Thant, for example, is a recognition, in
some form, of the growing influence of this group in world
affairs as reflected in the United Nations.
The exercise of political influence at the General Assembly
is both many-sided and subtle. The threats of retaliation or
warning of adverse consequences can be defined as the essence
of pressure. Attempts to achieve results by using extra-
Assembly threats--for instance the threat to reduce foreign
aid--are almost entirely limited to the two great rival powers.
Member states may attempt to influence each other by other per-
suasive means without applying pressure: by nonalignment--
threatening to request help from the other superpower if a great
power threat is implemented, by taking initiatives that limit
the effective alternatives of others, or by the use of the quid
pro quo that receives the mutual accommodation of support. Bar-
gaining in the lobbies of the Assembly is, perhaps, most frequent
12Kanlid I. Babaa, "The Third Force and the United Nations,"
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
,
Vol. 362 (November, 1965), pp. 90.
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in connection with elections. In view of the complicated diplomacy
of bargaining at the Assembly, a keen sense of strategy and
tactics is also prerequisite to an effective use of one's re-
sources. "Effective use of these techniques is essential to any
delegation aspiring to maximize its influence in the politics
13
of the Assembly."
Of more scientific interest, a study of voting groups can
tell us about groups and coalitions in ways that can be related
to broader theories about Assembly behavior. The alignments
of member-states and coalition groups are very important dynamic
factors in multiple equilibrium. These efforts are spent in
maneuvering to ensure that the proposal finally voted on will
be as favorable to one's interest as possible. Two or more groups
must combine to make a majority, and majorities on each of the
different super issues are of different compositions. In con-
trast to politics within national parliamentary assemblies, it
may provide many fruitful insights and hypotheses. Naturally
there are differences between national systems and the inter-
national model here suggested, though the system of multi-
group coalitions was approximated in the French Third and
Fourth Republics. The multi-party pattern of shifting coali-
tions is characteristic of the multi-party parliament. Coali-
tions are brought together by affinities of various kinds, such
as geographic location, security concerns, ideology, cultural
1
1
Robert 0. Keohane, op. cit .
, p. 24.
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and historical kinship, and the desirability of an issue as a
whole. Each issue and each debate require a different diplo-
matic technique and a different solution. Any particular resolu-
tion has to take account of the American position, the Russian
position, the Nasser position, and just about every other position.
Since cross-group coalitions are very much in evidence on
a number of issues, there is in fact a multiplicity of groups
with varying degrees of cohesion. This is particularly true of
issues relating to disarmament, while also true of votes on peace-
keeping, colonialism, other political issues, and social and
economic questions. The composition of cross-group coalitions
varies but participating states are usually states more mod-
erate than most other members of their groups. These groups
may be treated as a major part of "a dynamic interplay of inter-
national, military-political, and socio-economic factors and
14pressures, constituting a multiple equilibrium."
The contemporary pattern of multiple equilibrium is multi-
dimensional because it is reflected in the attempts to combine
political, economic, social, moral, cultural, religious equilib-
rium in a long range cooperative approach. Aid, trade, religion,
political system and other social forces all show high connec-
tion with the equilibrium dimension. Resorting to the peaceful
method of multi-cooperative character depends on the disposition
to mutual promise under the pressure of common interests. Accord-
ing to Bruce Russett, military cooperation, economic interdependence
14George Liska, International Equilibrium, p. 23.
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and foreign aid are partial determinants of conflict politics in
international relations.
The fundamental proposition of multiple equilibrium will
rely mainly on ideas of progressive, stable, and unstable
equilibrium. At best, the several groups should reinforce each
other in a progressive equilibrium movement; at worse, their
efficiency and that of the entire organization will decrease
as a result of an unstable equilibrium. Theoretically, a
multiple equilibrium can be progressive, stable, or unstable.
An equilibrium is stable when various groups can attain their
best positions of interests and values through negotiations.
It is unstable when the distribution of powers or interests
cannot be settled with an agreement particularly while a great
power or an important group is involved. The refusal of the
Soviet Union and other member states to pay assessments levied
by the General Assembly to cover expenses of peacekeeping forces
in the Congo, which has caused the United Nations financial
crisis, can perhaps be considered as a case of unstable equili-
brium, while the equilibrium of the United Nations is seriously
threatened.
Bruce M. Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," The
Journa l of Conflict Resolution , Vol. 7, No. 2 (June, 1963)
pp. 97-109.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The so-called East-West rivalry with two leading members of
bipolarity is losing its definite character of political climate
in the General Assembly. In bipolar confrontation, some analysts
believe that a Cold War alignment is paramount in all voting at
the United Nations and agree that at- least two distinct voting
conflicts underlie particular roll calls in differeing degrees.
Ernst Haas has interpreted Assembly politics in terms of a
"balancing" process between Cold War demands and the political-
1
economic and anti-colonial demands of underdeveloped countries.
In a similar way, Lincoln Bloomfield has described the General
Assembly as a prime political forum for the nations which remain
outside the East-West camps and pursue their own goals of pol-
itical influence, economic improvement and racial dignity. In
this situation, "what might be called the North-South conflict
2
cuts across the East-West issues." The General Assembly is
faced frequently with two sets of issues : those concerning
relationships between the two great power blocs (cold war
issues) and those primarily affecting the relations between
established, economically developed states and economically
less-developed states, many of which have attained sovereignty
only recently. The activities of the United Nations in trans-
muting colonialism into new forms and promoting a more
Ernst Haas, "Regionalism, Functional ism, and Universal
International Organization," pp. 258-263.
2
Lincoln Bloomfield, op. cit
. , p. 10
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satisfactory distribution of welfare for long-range security
are taking shape as an essential. It is evident that anticolonial-
ism is the strongest force which binds the Afro-Asian states
together in a common bond of determination to reduce the friction
of the East-West rivalry. Thus "East vs. West" no longer dom-
inates most issues in the Assembly.
The apparent simplified bi-polarity of the immediate post-
war era may be giving way to a new configuration in which a
growing number of "small" states refuse to commit themselves to
either side. "Leadership possibilities in the General Assembly
tend to open more for small states toward the political center
of the organization than for those in the camp of either super-
3
power." More opportunities may exist in the Assembly, since
neither Great Power holds sway. Freedom of action is left to
those who are bound to represent either rival camp. To them, it
is not the influence of a group which unites them together, but
the influence of common interests on important questions which
creates the unity of the group.
The one-state-one-vote procedure weights the United Nations'
operation in favor of the newer, smaller members. In recent
years, the membership has increased by more than double its
original number and has made more considerable progress toward
true universality. By bringing the smaller and weaker nations
together, the Organization has conferred upon them power greater
than the sum of their separate national resources, along with
Robert 0. Keohane, op. cit . , p. 33.
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a correlative responsibility in world affairs. Furthermore, the
United Nations under Mr. Hammarskjold developed a strong execu-
tive which, when supported by a majority, can offer protection
to the weak against the strong. It has become a living institu-
tion since majority rule became a deciding force.
Some observers are convinced that these smaller states
contribute least to international security and to the Organiza-
tion's finances, yet take the most out of it in terms of economic
aid and political support. It is a fact that the multi-group
system, particularly the voting system, in the Assembly is not
entirely satisfactory. Under the one-state-one-vote procedure,
the emerging nations have voting strength out of all propor-
tion to their populations, powers, contributions, and respon-
sibilities in the United Nations. The situation regarding formal
voting strength is illustrated by the fact that after 1964,
seventy-six member countries, paying about five percent of
regular budget assessments and comprising sixteen percent of
the population of all members, could form a two- third majority.
However, it is often said that the equal voting formula under-
states the actual capacity of great powers to influence U.N.
decisions.
It is often said that the system of one vote for one state
and the preponderance of votes by the middle and smaller powers
4
Catherine Senf Manno, "Majority Decisions and Minority
Responses in the U.N. General Assembly," Journal of Conflict
Resolution
,
Vol. X, No. 1 (March 1966)
,
p. 7.
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damage the usefulness of the United Nations. It seems quite
absurd that the smallest member should have the same voting
strength as one of the great powers. It is certainly not a
perfect system, but is there any proposal for weighted voting
that would not have even greater defects? The only alternative
to equality of voting is inequality of voting, which would
require that each state should be given proportional votes
determined by such factors as population, area and financial
contribution to the budget of the United Nations. In fact, it
is questionable whether the proposed weight voting system is
practicable at the present time.
U Thant has criticized the proposal for weighted voting to
prevent new African and Asian countries from "running away with"
the world organization; weighted voting would give larger states
proportionately more voting strength. He likens the General
Assembly rule of one vote for each nation to the democratic
principle of "one vote per adult human being, to rich or poor,
strong or weak, learned or ignorant." He further argues that
these critics of the United Nations ignore one of the funda-
mental principles of the Charter, which states that "the organiza-
tion is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all
its members as also the principle of equal rights of nations,
large and small." Archishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus
"U.N. Voting Shift Opposed by Thant," New York Times
(June 11, 1962).
6
Ibid.
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is also strongly opposed to any suggestion that voting in the
United Nations be proportionate to the size or power of the
members. Such suggestions, he says, are "undemocratic" and
indicate a return to "power politics" in the world organization.
Furthermore, "the concept of power voting would eliminate the
moral influence of the small states toward an objective approach
to world problems based on principle." Most countries agree
that the United Nations system is necessary and desirable in
its present form; very few strong demands for constitutional
change are in evidence. All members adhere to the universality
principle on membership questions.
A large increase in membership has had a deep effect upon
the structure and performance of the Organization. In addition,
the very nature and procedures of the Assembly have changed
and dveloped. These developments do have one thing in common.
They indicate a youthful vigor in the body, which increases
as young nations enter it. They show the U N. functioning as
an indispensable diplomatic tool in the hands of big groups and
as a sort of new parliament in which the smaller members can
find a degree of equality with the great powers never before
known. They show that a sense of international responsibility
is not a monopoly held by powerful, rich or large countries.
Time and again in the affairs of the United Nations, voting
groups have played a decisive role in efforts to preserve or
Makarios Opposes Shift in U.N. Voting," New York Times
(June 12, 1962).
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restore international security and peace.
Recently in actual voting results, it has been found that
the great powers of East and West have not succeeded—in terms
of voting victories-- in offsetting their small share of formal
voting strength by informal sources of influences. In fact, a
large array of developing states, known as the seventy-five,
acts as an intra-Assembly interest group working for favorable
trade and development policies. Fortunately this interest group
is very flexible and less cohesive. Voting patterns will be
changed, new alignments will come into existence, and the pressure
of the small states upon the great powers will be proportionately
intensified.
The gravity centers of majority power have shifted in a
number of sessions of the United Nations. Early domination by
the Latin American group in conjunction with the Commonwealth,
Benelux, and Scandianavian groups was gradually altered as
first the Arab group and then the Afro-Asian group joined Latin
America in leading the majority. With the continuing division
in the Western groups, the Afro-Asian and Arab groups led the
majority (in the IXth Session). Later, the Latin American group
and the Commonwealth group regained their earlier position,
and then the Western groups were once again "in control" of the
Q
Assembly majority. The growth of the Assembly in the last
several sessions has caused "the absolute majority" to pass
8
Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations,
p. 105.
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from the West to the African and Asian states.
Bloc politics in the General Assembly can no longer be
considered a temporary phenomenon. Blocs and groups constitute
a regularized, though informal, aspect of the organization of
the United Nations. They play an integral part in the process
of dealing with issues and an increasing role in facilitating
the operation of the United Nations. It is apparent that the
groups which have a very cohesive internal voting record, such
as the Soviet bloc and the Arab, Benelux, and Scandinavian
groups, generally tend toward a minority position in the Assembly.
They are therefore already in a bargaining position to urge
other groups to consider the desirability of making concessions.
Thus each member must evaluate its policies and role in the
United Nations and the implications of the nature and extent
of the bloc and group.
It is clear that participation in a group is advantageous
to a member state, and participation in several groups even
more advantageous. A "non-group" member is forced to rely on
more subtle political and economic pressures for gaining support
for its point of view and consequently must risk individual
moves which may have lasting unfavorable effects. Participa-
tion in a group can open avenues for a variety of diplomatic
techniques. It also provides an opportunity to create a combined
voting power which can be a critical factor in negotiation with
other groups.
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Not surprisingly, whatever its advantages to individual
member states bloc and group development can make a constructive
contribution to negotiation within the United Nations only as
long as the groups do not become intransigent. As the United Na-
tions approaches universal membership of the world community of
states, and if present trends continue, there is a very real
possibility that group coalitions may prevent conclusive decisions
by the major powers. In the interest of every member nation
as well as in the interest of the United Nations as a whole, it
would seem essential to encourage the development of smaller
rather than larger groups.
Bloc politics have been both praised and blamed, depending
upon the viewpoint of the commentator. The group creates a
potential for manipulative dealing in votes to the detriment
of the United Nations as a whole and to the development of
peace. It has led to what Sir Carl Berendsen (the New Zealand
delegate to the United Nations) called an "irresponsible
bargaining" of votes which he and many others think is dis-
gusting and menacing. Dean Rusk argues that the existence of
an informal U.N. machinery for consultations affects the will-
ingness of governments to discuss problems at the United Nations.
He says that "debate without full advance preparation by negotia-
tion is likely to be unproductive and disconcerting, and it can
be dangerous." On the optimistic side, it has been argued
Dean Rusk, "Parliamentary Diplomacy- -Debate vs. Negotia-
tion," World Affairs Interpreter
, Vol. 26 (Summer 1955),
p. 123.
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that the Organization offers opportunities for furthering
cooperation in many fields. It provides occasions not only for
focusing world opinion, but also for negotiating diplomacy.
Internationally, the groups might improve the chances of
general collective security and international equilibrium.
Collective security efforts for the different regional group-
ings in the United Nations, as Ernst Haas suggests, are trans-
lated into two operational maxims --permissive enforcement and
balancing. In line with permissive enforcement, different
groupings of states have tried to obtain United Nations legiti-
mization of their policies. After a related countermove, bal-
ancing attempts based on compromises within and between group-
ings have tried to avert a clear-cut victory by either side.
The result may be a delicate negotiating process, 'with the
world organization the forum, not of a community conscience or
a concert of power, but of counterbalancing forces unwilling to
seek a showdown, fearful of alienating friends or neutrals, and
therefore willing to make concessions."
A complete multi-group system of the equilibrium of all
social forces might in itself encourage cooperative responses
to interdependence, discourage aggression, and decrease the need
while increasing the ability and willingness for applying sanctions.
In this case, the new alignments would not constitute just
additional "Great Powers," and would be restrained, if necessary
Ernst Haas, "Regionalism, Functional ism, and Universal
International Organization," p. 240.
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by means of the power reserved to the world organization. The
system of multiple equilibrium may promote the long range
bases of security and facilitate peaceful change. It is also
decisive for peace and tranquility.
A multi-group model of the international system, perhaps,
may be considered as a theoretical extension of the traditional
pattern of a balancing system, emerging from regional alliances
of varying degrees of integration. Some major modern ideologies
deny at least implicitly the adequacy of nationalism by aiming
at ultimately global solutions. Idealists pay tribute to world-
wide interdependence. However, universalism is today still
premature and ambitious. Regionalism, as Walter Lippmann
observes, provides an escape from the inadequacies of the nation-
state and the impractibility of a world state. The develop-
ment of regional groups, which will not be considered incom-
patible with the goal of the United Nations, can be used as
building groups in the construction of a future, international
peace and order. This is one additional reason why a multi-
group model of the international system proposed may be useful.
Bloc politics is perhaps the most pertinent system to
present-day world politics of all patterns of the international
system. The international system for the creation and main-
tenance of dynamic equilibrium is no longer dependent upon the
balance of power. The groups seek to avoid conflict by
Anwar Hussain Syed, Walter Lippmann' s Philosophy of
International Politics (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1963), p. 189.
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compromising disputes upon the basis of relative involvements
of interests. If the relative involvements can be diplomatic-
ally determined and if the given object of controversy is one
that permits such a technique of disposal, a compromise reflect-
ing the differences in commitment is often not too difficult
to arrange.
The multi-group international system would be able to pro-
mote political-military and socio-economic equilibrium, by being
itself an internal equilibrium especially with respect to region-
al arrangements and normative principles. Only then can the
system be stabilized on a sufficiently high but still equil-
ibrium level; the group becomes a major factor for long-range
security, combining stability with progressive peaceful change.
The future of the United Nations and the purpose of peace can
be fostered to "a greater degree by the development of a multi-
,12
plicity of cross interests, none of which are exclusive,...
To sum up, the Assembly's behavior cannot be satisfactorily
explained either in its own terms, as expressed in the "one
state, one vote" rule, or by reference to the outside world
alone. It is in the interaction between groups and "parliamen-
tary" politics that an understanding of the Assembly must be
found. At all times, the Assembly provides an enormous area
for genuine peaceful competition among the groups to the advan-
tages of all concerned.
12Thomas Hovet, Jr. , Bloc Polities in the United Nations
,
p. 120.
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The purpose of the present thesis is twofold. First, it
is to examine, to survey and to evaluate, in an introductory
form, world politics on a "regional" scale in the General
Assembly. Secondly, it attempts to define a new model of
the international system, playing multiple equilibrium along
the blocs and groups in the Assembly arena, on the basis of a
tentative projection of theoretical approaches. The choice
of the General Assembly as a model for primary analysis of
international systems may be revealed by the fact that the
Assembly is a realistic representation of the present day
world.
The growth of bloc politics has been one of the most
striking developments of postwar world politics. Such a develop-
ment has made it possible for small states to exert an in-
fluence far beyond either their population or political impor-
tance when they combine their voting strength on particular
issues. A major power can manipulate arrangements which will
provide adequate voting support for its views on matters of
primary concern provided it can recognize the interests of
small states. Thus the criterion of a nation's power is its
ability to induce support in quasi-parliamentary dealings
rather than the increase or decrease of territorial possessions.
Bloc politics is. perhaps the most pertinent phenomenon of
present-day world politics of all patterns of the international
system. It can not be considered temporary. Blocs and groups
constitute a regularized, though informal, aspect of the
organization of the United Nations. They play an increasing
role and facilitate the operation of the United Nations. Thus
each member state must evaluate its policies and role in the
United Nations by the implications of the nature and extent
of the bloc and group.
A multi-group model of the international system may be
considered as a theoretical extension of the traditional pattern
of balancing system, emerging from "regional" alliances of
varying degrees of integration. The development of "regional"
groups, which will not be considered incompatible with the goals
of the United Nations, can be used as building groups in the
construction of a future Utopia, international peace and order.
The international system for creation and maintenance of dynamic
equilibrium is no longer dependent upon the balance of power.
The groups seek to avoid conflict by compromising disputes upon
the basis of relative involvements of interests.
The political influence of groups in the General Assembly
might improve the chances of general collective security and
international equilibrium. A complete multi-group system of
the equilibrium might arrange all forces to encourage coopera-
tive responses to interdependence, discourage aggression, and
decrease the need while increasing the ability and willingness
for applying sanctions. The system of multiple equilibrium
may promote the long range bases of security and facilitate
peaceful change. It is also decisive for peace and tranquility.
This is another reason why an equilibrium theory proposal may
be valuable.
At all times, the General Assembly provides an enormous
area for genuine peaceful competition among groups to the
advantage of all concerned. The future of the United Nations
and the purpose of peace can best be fostered by the develop-
ment of a multiplicity of cross interests, none of which is
exclusive.
